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The	 research	 reported	 here	 gives	 priority	 to	 understanding	 the	 inter‐temporal	 resource	
allocation	requirements	of	a	program	of	technological	changes	that	could	halt	global	warming	by	
completing	 the	 transition	 to	 a	 “green”	 (zero	 net	 CO2‐	 emission)	 production	 regime	within	 the	
possibly	brief	 finite	 interval	 that	 remains	before	Earth’s	 climate	 is	driven	beyond	a	 catastrophic	
tipping	point.	 	This	paper	formulates	a	multi‐phase,	just‐in‐time	transition	model	incorporating	
carbon‐based	 and	 carbon‐free	 technical	 options	 requiring	 physical	 embodiment	 in	 durable	
production	facilities,	and	having	performance	attributes	 that	are	amenable	to	enhancement	by	
directed	R&D	expenditures.	Transition	paths	that	indicate	the	best	ordering	and	durations	of	the	
phases	 in	which	 intangible	and	 tangible	capital	 formation	 is	 taking	place,	and	capital	 stocks	of	
different	 types	 are	 being	 utilized	 in	 production,	 or	 scrapped	when	 replaced	 types	 embodying	
socially	more	efficient	technologies,	are	obtained	from	optimizing	solutions	for	each	of	a	trio	of	
related	 models	 that	 couple	 the	 global	 macro‐economy’s	 dynamics	 with	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	
climate	 system.	 	 They	 describe	 the	 flows	 of	 consumption,	 CO2	 emissions	 and	 the	 changing	
atmospheric	 concentration	 of	 green‐house	 gas	 (which	 drives	 global	warming),	 along	with	 the	
investment	 dynamics	 required	 for	 the	 timely	 transformation	of	 the	production	 regime.	 	These	
paths	 are	 found	 as	 the	welfare‐optimizing	 solutions	 of	 three	 different	 “stacked	Hamiltonians”,	
each	corresponding	to	one	of	our	trio	of	integrated	endogenous	growth	models	that	have	been	
calibrated	 comparably	 to	 emulate	 the	 basic	 global	 setting	 for	 the	 “transition	 planning”	
framework	 of	 dynamic	 integrated	 requirements	 analysis	 modeling	 (DIRAM).	 As	 the	 paper’s	
introductory	section	explains,	this	framework	is	proposed	in	preference	to	the	(IAM)	approach	
that	environmental	and	energy	economists	have	made	familiar	in	integrated	assessment	models	
of	 climate	 policies	 that	 would	 rely	 on	 fiscal	 and	 regulatory	 instruments	 ‐‐	 but	 eschew	 any	
analysis	of	the	essential	technological	transformations	that	would	be	required	for	those	policies	
to	 have	 the	 intended	 effect.	 	 Simulation	 exercises	 with	 our	 models	 explore	 the	 optimized	
transition	 paths’	 sensitivity	 to	 parameter	 variations,	 including	 alternative	 exogenous	
specifications	of	 the	 location	of	 a	pair	 of	 successive	 climate	 “tipping	points”:	 the	 first	 of	 these	
initiates	 higher	 expected	 rates	 of	 damage	 to	 productive	 capacity	 by	 extreme	 weather	 events	
driven	by	 the	 rising	 temperature	of	 the	Earth’s	 surface;	whereas	 the	 second,	 far	more	 serious	
“climate	 catastrophe”	 tipping	 point	 occurs	 at	 a	 still	 higher	 temperature	 (corresponding	 to	 a	
higher	 atmospheric	 concentration	 of	 CO2).	 In	 effect,	 that	 sets	 the	 point	 before	 which	 the	











Economic	 developments	 thus	 far	 in	 human	 history	 have	 been	 linked	 closely	 with	
progress	 in	methods	 for	 the	bulk	 conversion	 into	useful	work	of	 the	 energy	 stored	 in	 carbon‐
based	fuels.1	Burning	wood,	coal,	oil,	and	natural	gas	gives	rise	to	CO2‐emissions	that,	together	
with	 releases	 of	 other	 greenhouse	 gasses	 (GHG’s)	 like	 methane,	 are	 now	 thought	 to	 be	
responsible	 for	 the	 considerable	 warming	 of	 the	 earth’s	 atmosphere	 since	 the	 industrial	
revolution	 of	 the	 late	 eighteenth	 century	 and	 the	 worrying	 prospect	 of	 that	 upward	 trend	
continuing	for	years	to	come.2		
1.1	Motivation:	climate	science	and	climate	policy	
The	 implied	 future	 consequences	 are	 “bad	 news”	 on	 a	 number	 of	 related	 counts:	 sea	
levels	will	 rise,	 tropical	 diseases	will	 become	more	wide‐spread,	 storms	will	 be	more	 violent,	
patterns	 of	 rainfall	 will	 change	 (affecting	 agriculture),	 and	 fresh‐water	 supply	 shortages	 will	
become	a	problem	due	to	global	glacier	retreat,	and	so	on.3	 	Most	of	these	consequent	changes	
represent	significant	costs	to	society	en	route	to	the	potential	emergence	of	catastrophic	climate	
instability.4	 But,	 more	 worrying	 still	 is	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 environmental	 changes	 set	 in	






greater	 plausibility	 and	 disturbing	 palpability	 to	 the	 conjectured	 existence	 of	 global	 climate	









view	on	 the	 consequences	 for	 the	world	of	 up	 to	6	degrees	 additional	warming	 for	 each	degree	of	 extra	warming,	







the	 appearance	 of	 	 positive	 feedbacks,	 reversible	 phase	 transitions,	 phase	 transitions	 with	 hysteresis	 effects,	 and	
bifurcations	where	the	transition	is	smooth	but	the	future	path	of	the	system	depends	on	having	been	perturbed	at	a	
critical	point.	 	On	abrupt	climate	changes	 	and	“earth	 tipping	points”	see	Alley	 ,	Marotzke,	 	Nordhaus,	 	Overpeck	et	











mean	 global	 temperature	 to	 rise	 above	 a	 critical	 threshold	 of	 that	 kind	 would	 launch	 a	 self‐




	 More	 than	 simply	 adding	 another	 ground	on	which	 the	 “precautionary	principle”	 calls	
urgently	 for	 mitigation	 of	 CO2	 emissions,	 that	 existential	 threat	 undermines	 sanguine	
presuppositions	 that	 “adaptations"	 by	 contemporary	 societies	 to	 a	 continuing	 gradual	 rise	 in	
global	 mean	 temperature	 would	 eventually	 bring	 humanity	 to	 a	 significantly	 warmer	 but	
nonetheless	viable	equilibrium	environment;	that	that	current	climate	policy	should	be	aimed	to	
effect	 a	 correspondingly	 gradual,	 economic	 welfare‐maximizing	 approach	 to	 that	 distant	 but	
attainable	goal.		The	alternative	prospect	now	more	clearly	envisaged	by	many	climate	scientists	
–namely,	 that	 the	 rising	 trend	 of	mean	 global	 temperature	 could	 take	 Earth’s	 climate	 system	
beyond	a	“catastrophe	tipping	point”	without	the	consequences	manifesting	themselves	plainly	
for	some	time	to	come	‐‐	raises	grave	doubts	about	the	formulaic	economic	advice	that	continue	
to	be	widely	espoused.	Climate	policy,	 it	 is	 said,	 should	devise	 instruments	 to	guide	 the	world	
economy	along	an	optimal	path	 that	balances	 the	present	value	of	 social	welfare	sacrificed	by	
actions	to	restrict	CO2	emissions,	against	the	present	value	of	the	future	net	social	welfare	gains	
resulting	 from	 slowing	 the	 accumulation	 of	 atmospheric	 CO2	 –	 just	 enough	 to	 allow	 	modern	







coastal	 flooding	 and	 drought	 must,	 undoubtedly,	 be	 made	 part	 of	 the	 response	 to	 global	









8	 See	 Hall	 and	 Behl	 (2006)	 on	 the	 persisting	 failure	 of	 the	 economic	 literature	 on	 integrated	 assessment	 models	
(IAMs)	 to	 address	 the	 implications	 of	 climate	 scientists’	 conclusions	 and	 explanatory	 conjectures	 based	 on	 the	
paleoclimate	 evidence	 of	 “climate	 flickering”;	 esp.,	 pp.	 461‐462,	 for	 a	 detailed	 critique	 of	 the	 representation	 of	 the	
climate	 sub‐system	 in	 Nordhaus	 and	 Boyer’s	 (2000)	 updating	 of	 the	 original	 (Nordhaus	 1994)	 DICE	 model.	 The	
assumption	that	radiative	forcing	due	to	the	accumulation	of	atmospheric	CO2	would	drive	a	smooth	transition	to	a	
higher	equilibrium	temperature	of	the	Earth’s	surface	is	retained	in	the	latest	update	of	DICE	(see	Nordhaus	2010),	as	
well	 as	 in	 the	 annualized	 version	 of	 the	model	 that	 Cai,	 Judd	 and	 Lontzek	 (2012)	 create	 en	 route	 to	 SDICE,	 their		
stochastic	control	version	of	DICE	–	which	in	other	respects	constitutes	a	significant	advance	in	the	IAMs	literature.									
9  As	will	be	seen	(in	sect.	3.2),	the	third	of	the	models	presented	here	allows	for	warming	–driven	damages	to	global	
productive	capacity,	but	does	not	also	consider	 	 the	option	of	undertaking	“defensive”	capital	 formation	that	would		
reduce	those	damages.	Such	investment	should	be	viewed	as	a	form	of	“adaptation”	and	although	its	importance	has	
become	more	widely	appreciated,	it	remains	the	case	that	most	of	the	available	integrated	policy	assessment	models	





and	 the	high	 rate	of	 continuing	emissions,	 it	 is	 becoming	more	and	more	doubtful	 that	 global	
warming	can	be	kept	from	adding	a	gain	of	more	than	2o	Kelvin	to	the	mean	surface	temperature	
that	 prevailed	 throughout	 the	 recorded	 pre‐industrial	 millennium.	 	 Such	 a	 large	 temperature	
gain	is	considered	to	be	a	threshold	that	ought	not	to	be	crossed,	for	fear	of	triggering	runaway	
global	warming	and	the	attendant	societal	chaos	and	widespread	human	losses.10		
	 Unfortunately,	 the	 mere	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 climate	 catastrophe	
tipping	 points	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 ensure	 that	 CO2	 and	 other	GHG	 emissions	will	 be	 sufficiently	
reduced.	 The	 BRIC	 group	 of	 industrially	 developing	 countries	 has	 maintained	 astonishingly	
rapid	 rates	 of	 economic	 growth	 during	 the	 past	 two	 decades,	 relying	 heavily	 on	 fossil	 fuel	
sources	 of	 energy.	 The	peoples	of	 these	nations	 think	 it	 entirely	 appropriate	 that	 they	 should	
continue	 not	 only	 to	 lift	 their	 remaining	 masses	 from	 poverty,	 but	 advance	 toward	 levels	 of	







and	 the	 governments	 of	 other	 countries	 to	 begin	 taking	 steps	 to	 reduce	 their	 economies’	
dependence	on	nuclear	power;	the	closing	of	a	significant	number	of	nuclear	power	stations	has	
been	 announced	 in	 Germany,	 raising	 concerns	 that	 the	 electric	 generation	 capacity	 thus	
abandoned	will	be	replaced	with	new	coal‐fired	plants.12	In	short,	there	are	strong	political	and	




Pacific	 with	 paleoclimate	 data	 suggests	 that	 this	 critical	 ocean	 region,	 and	 probably	 the	 planet	 as	 a	 whole,	 is	
approximately	as	warm	now	as	at	the	Holocene	maximum	and	within	≈1°C	of	the	maximum	temperature	of	the	past	
million	 years.	 	We	 conclude	 that	 global	warming	 of	more	 than	 ≈1°C,	 relative	 to	 2000,	will	 constitute	 ‘‘dangerous’’	
climate	change	as	judged	from	likely	effects	on	sea	level	and	extermination	of	species.” 
11	According	to	a	World	Resources	Institute	report	(see	Yang	and	Cui	(2012))	a	recent	WRI	survey	found	1,199	coal‐
fired	plants	currently	proposed	globally	 in	59	countries,	over	 two‐thirds	of	 them	in	China	and	India	with	aggregate	
capacity	representing	about	three‐quarters	of	the	projected	global	additions	to	installed	mega‐wattage.	The	number	
of	projects	planned	in	India	(455)	exceeds	those	in	China	(363),	but	the	latter’s	plants	are	on	average	larger,	so	that	












power	plants	 is	 that	 the	 low	 international	 price	 of	 coal	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 kept	 down	by	 the	 expansion	of	 still	 cheaper	
substitutes	like	natural	gas,	and	increasing	coal	extraction	rates	(induced	by	expectations	of	future	carbon	taxes).	This	




global	population	 that	presently	 are	major	users	of	 energy	 from	 fossil	 fuels.	But	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 imagine	 that	 such	an	
impulse	would	 gather	 political	 force	 spontaneously	 from	 a	 transcendent	 ideological	movement,	 or	 that	 it	 could	 be	
‐ 4 ‐ 
 
	 With	 humanity	 today	 seemingly	 headed	 almost	 unavoidably	 towards	 a	 worrisomely	
problematic	 future	 climate,	 it	 is	 all	 the	more	 pertinent	 to	 thoroughly	 explore	 what	 economic	
theory	informed	by	climate	science	can	tell	us,	firstly	about	the	broad	requirements	for	satisfying	
the	 desire	 to	 sustain	 development	 and	 the	 future	 growth	 of	 economic	 welfare	 by	 allocating	
resources	 so	 as	 to	 avert	 drifting	 irreversibly	 into	 a	 catastrophically	 transformed	 global	





before	 arriving	 at	 a	 tipping	 point	 into	 irreversible	 “runaway”	 climate	 change	 (TPIRCC,	
hereinafter).	
	 	Only	 when	 we	 have	 a	 clearer	 vision	 of	 what	 would	 be	 required	 to	 travel	 the	
technological	 path	 to	 a	 stabilized	 global	 climate	 that	would	be	 least	 costly	 in	 terms	of	 human	
welfare	 (i.e.,	 “first‐best”	 welfare‐optimal),	 will	 we	 then	 be	 in	 a	 better	 position	 than	 now	 to	
realistically	 consider	 the	policy	measures	 that	might	be	 able	 to	 realize	 such	 a	program;	or,	 to	
stating	the	nature	of	latter	challenge	more	precisely,	to	re‐focus	negotiations	about	national	and	
international	 agreements	 on	 continuously	 monitor‐able	 actions	 to	 implement	 a	 socially	 and	
politically	 feasible	 approximation	 to	 the	 idealized,	 first‐best	 welfare	 optimum	 path	 toward	
sustainable	development	in	stabilized	global	climate.14		
	 Unfortunately,	in	our	view,	much	too	much	time	already	has	passed	during	which	serious	






whether	 through	 immediate	 localized	 pollution	 of	 the	 nano‐particle	 laden	 air	 inhaled	 by	 the	
population	in	urban	areas,	or	the	rising	concentration	of	atmospheric	GHG	and	all	of	its	present	
and	 future	 global	 consequences–‐are	 labeled	 as	 “externalities”.	 They	 are	 not	 reflected	 fully	 in	
“free	market	prices”	of	carbon	fuels,	and	hence	do	not	register	among	the	private	costs	of	those	
engaged	in	combusting	those	materials.	
	 	Starting	 from	 this	 diagnosis	 of	 the	 source	 of	 the	 climate	 problem,	 a	 substantial	
consensus	 among	 environmental	 and	 energy	 economists	 has	 found	 the	 indicated	 course	 of	





private	 incentives	 to	 reduce	 CO2	 emissions	 in	 ways	 that	 will	 be	 least‐costly	 to	 the	 actors;	
“getting	the	prices	right”	now	and	in	the	future	therefore	will	be	sufficient	to	fix	the	“externality”	
that	has	allowed	economically	self‐interested	humans	to	set	their	planet	on	its	warming	course.		
	 There	 have	 been	 real	 advances	 in	 analyzing	 the	 likely	 effects	 of	 using	 fiscal	 and	
regulatory	instruments	in	the	most	welfare	efficient	ways	to	fix	the	CO2	emissions	“externality,”	
                                                                                                                                                                                         






discernible	 and	 unwarranted	 reluctance	 among	 economists	 to	 examine	 the	 technological	
requirements	of	what	“the	market”	would	have	to	accomplish	by	altering	private	 incentives	to	
curtail	 the	emissions	of	CO2.	 	 It	 is	as	 if	 those	researchers	had	said,	perhaps	not	aloud:	 “I’m	an	
economist	 not	 an	 engineer,	 and	 since	 I	 have	 good	 cause	 to	 expect	 that	 markets	 will	 do	 an	
efficient	job	of	resource	allocation	once	we	have	removed	the	troublesome	externality,	why	do	I	
have	 to	 be	 concerned	 about	 the	 details	 of	 the	 technological	 solutions	 that	 rational	 economic	
agents	will	arrive	at	when	guided	by	the	right	prices?”	
	 	The	evident	problem	with	this	line	of	response	is	that	“getting	the	global	price	of	carbon	
right,”	 and	 keeping	 it	 right,	 are	 not	 so	 simple	 tasks	 for	 “institutional	 engineering”	 and	
international	 political	 economy	 as	 it	 is	 convenient	 to	 imagine	 while	 formulating	 and	 solving	
those	 integrated	assessment	models	 (IAMs).15	 	 Secondly,	 if	 economists’	 attention	were	 to	 turn	
away	 from	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 CO2	 emissions	 externality	 for	 a	 moment	 or	 two,	 they	 would	
remember	 that	 there	 are	 other,	 well‐known	 externalities	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 thwart	 the	
spontaneous	 emergence	 of	 socially	 efficient	 decentralized	 responses	 to	 rightly‐priced	 carbon.		
	 Two	 such	 externalities	 are	 so	 familiar	 that	 they	 may	 be	 mentioned	 without	 further	
elaboration:	existing	technological	knowledge	must	be	implemented,	and	implementation	under	
actual	 field	 conditions	 may	 require	 investment	 in	 researching	 incremental	 adaptations	 and	
interactions	 between	 providers	 of	 equipment	 embodying	 that	 knowledge	 and	 its	 users.	 But	
there	 are	 knowledge	 benefits	 from	 learning‐by‐doing,	 and	 investments	 in	 research	 that	 are	
difficult	 if	not	 impossible	 for	private	agents	 in	competitive	markets	 to	appropriate	completely,	
giving	 rise	 to	 well‐known	 information	 transaction	 externalities	 and	 “spill‐overs”	 that	 lead	 to	




15	 Beyond	 the	 issues	 of	 negotiating	 and	 enforcing	 coordinated	 international	 commitments	 to	 a	 cap‐and‐trade	
mechanisms	that	already	have	been	exposed	by	the	experience	with	the	UN	Kyoto	Protocols	and	the	attempts	to	go	





(not	 requiring	 repeated	 government	 actions,	 assuming	 the	 caps	were	 set	 correctly	 at	 the	 outset).	 Financial	 assets,	
however,	will	permit	securitization,	and	bonds	will	engender	the	formation	of	markets	for	derivatives,	and	so	on.	It	is	
not	a	trivial	problem	to	arrange	for	the	monitoring	and	regulating	of	the	issue	of	these	new	financial	instruments,	and	
to	 integrate	 global	markets	 for	 the	 varied	 types	 of	 licenses,	 so	 that	 the	 current	 and	 expected	 future	 prices	 of	 the	
underlying	assets	will	be	able	to	become	wildly	wrong.		Indeed,	the	difficulties	of	achieving	such	a	desirable	result	and	
the	costs	of	 failure	to	do	so	(again)	have	been	demonstrated	in	the	destructive	financial	crisis	of	2008‐2010	and	its	
economically	 and	 socially	 painful	 aftermath.	 	 Aside	 from	 these	 practical	 institutional	 details,	 and	 the	 political	
problems	 of	 arranging	 for	 national	 legislative	 bodies	 constituted	 of	 political	 representatives	 with	 short	 career	
horizons	 to	 commit	 themselves	 and	 their	 successors	 to	 distant	 future	 schedules	 of	 taxes	 on	 fossil	 fuels,	 there	 are	
serious	questions	about	 the	general	equilibrium	effects	of	a	commitment	 to	raise	 the	 future	relative	price	of	 	 those	


















will	 be	 required.	 Investment	 (either	 in	 generating	 future	 knowledge	 or	 in	 tangible	 production	
facilities	embodying	mature	and	novel	technologies)	is	the	‘conditio	sine	qua	non’	for	a	successful	
transition	towards	a	sustainable	 future.	The	transition	towards	sustainability	will	 therefore	be	








setting	 naturally	 gives	 rise	 to	 such	 questions	 as	 how	 long	 to	 continue	 using	 and	 investing	 in	
present	carbon‐based	technologies,	how	much	and	how	long	to	spend	efforts	on	improving	‘new’	






with	 questions	 that	 engineers	 and	 planners	 of	 systems	with	 improved	 performance	 property	
refer	to	as	“requirements	analysis”.		




one	 in	 which	 resource	 allocation	 is	 decentralized	 and	 reflects	 the	 distributed	 decisions	 and	
behaviors	of	many	human	agents.	Optimal	planning	models,	whether	of	the	deterministic	or	the	
stochastic	 variety,	 are	 familiar	 tools	 in	modern	economics	and	our	 research	simply	 (or	not	 so	
simply)	 extends	 their	use	 in	 the	 literature	of	macroeconomic	growth	models	by	applying	 it	 to	
examine	a	global	economy	whose	planner	has	 to	answer	 to	 resource	allocation	questions	 that	
are	 complicated	 by	 having	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 dynamic	 interconnections	 between	 his	
economy	and	the	geophysical	system	in	which	it	happens	to	be	inextricably	embedded.		
	 To	 find	 answers	 to	 these	 questions,	 we	 formulate	 an	 optimum	 control	 model	 that	
borrows	heavily	from	the	AK‐model	from	the	endogenous	growth	literature	(cf.	Rebelo	(1991)	in	
particular),	but	that	also	expands	upon	this	AK‐setting	in	a	number	of	ways.	First,	we	allow	for	
different	 technologies	 that	 can	 be	 used	 either	 next	 to	 each	 other	 or	 sequentially.	 Secondly,	 a	
technology	 is	characterized	not	only	by	 its	capital	productivity,	but	also	by	CO2‐emissions	per	
unit	real	output.	In	the	initial	business‐as‐usual	phase,	“carbon‐free”	technologies	will	be	taken	
to	 allow	production	with	 zero	net	 emissions	of	CO2,	 although	doing	 so	 at	 higher	unit	 costs	 of	
                                                                                                                                                                                         




capital	 (i.e.	 e.,	 being	 characterized	by	 a	 lower	 average	 and	marginal	 productivity	 of	 capital).18	
The	term	“net	emissions”	here	refers	to	the	flow	of	production‐generated	CO2			 	that	is	in	excess	
of	 the	 natural	 abatement	 capacities	 of	 the	 Earth’s	 oceans	 and	 forests,	 and,	 rather	 than	 being	
trapped	and	stored	there,	eventually	adds	to	the	concentration	of	atmospheric	GHG.	
			 	Third,	 we	 allow	 for	 the	 deactivation	 of	 existing	 technologies,	 i.e.	 the	 ‘scrapping’	 of	
existing	 technologies,	 as	 in	 the	 vintage	 literature.	 We	 show	 how	 the	 time	 of	 deactivation	 of	
existing	capacity	depends	on	 technological	parameters	but	also	on	emission	characteristics,	 in	
combination	with	 the	 shadow	 price	 of	 emissions.	 The	 latter	 suggests	 that	 the	 position	 of	 the	
climate	catastrophe	“tipping	point”	directly	influences	the	optimal	timing	of	such	moves	towards	
completing	the	switch	away	from	carbon‐based	production	‐‐	through	its	impact	on	the	shadow	
price	 of	 emissions.	 An	 exogenous	 shock,	 shrinking	 the	 space	 left	 for	 further	 accumulation	 of	
atmospheric	CO2	 (such	as	would	come	 in	 the	 form	of	 compelling	 evidence	 that	 the	onset	of	 a	
runaway	 process	 of	 warming	 could	 be	 triggered	 by	 a	 rise	 in	 the	 CO2	 –equivalent	 GHG	
concentration	 level	beyond	450	ppmv,	now	that	we	are	already	close	to	the	400	ppmv)	would	
send	 the	 shadow	 value	 of	 emissions	 suddenly	 upwards,	 forcing	 drastic	 actions	 to	 curtail	 the	
output	 of	 	 consumption	 goods	 toward	 subsistence‐satisfying	 levels	 so	 that	 as	 much	 of	 the	
operating	 capacity	 that	 remained	 could	 be	 used	 to	 rapidly	 build	 up	 the	 stock	 of	 carbon‐free	
capital.			
	 	Fourth,	 we	 allow	 for	 endogenous	 R&D	 based	 technical	 change.	 This	 requires	 a	
specification	 of	 the	 R&D	 function	 that	 is	 different	 from	 the	 ones	 found	 in	 Romer	 (1990),	 or	
Aghion	 and	Howitt	 (1991),	 for	 example,	 because	 technical	 change	 in	 our	model	 setting	 is	 not	









	 As	 the	 foregoing	 overview	of	 our	 approach	 implies,	 a	 central	 issue	 in	 the	model	 to	 be	
presented	here	is	the	fact	that	the	transition	towards	a	carbon‐free	production	system	entails	a	
switch	 in	 the	 deployment	 of	 production	 technologies	 that	 require	 the	 buildup	 of	 carbon‐free	
capacity	and	the	simultaneous	rundown	of	carbon‐based	capacity,	simply	because	the	one	type	
of	 capacity	 cannot	 be	 changed	 into	 the	 other	 type	 of	 capacity	 without	 new	 tangible	 capital	
formation.	 	 Therefore	we	 have	 opted	 for	 an	AK‐model	 setting	 (cf.	 Rebelo,	 1991)	 in	which	we	
allow	for	two	technologies	that	both	can	produce	output,	one	of	which	results	in	CO2	emissions	
whereas	the	other	does	not.		
		 The	 present	 paper	 summarizes	 part	 of	 the	 work	 conducted	 by	 the	 authors	 on	 the	
construction	 (and	 further	 extension)	 of	 a	 multi‐phase	 transition	 models	 incorporating	 the	
concepts	of	changes	in	technologies	that	are	embodied	in	tangible	and	durable	capital	goods,	and	
of	 the	 irreversibility	 of	 investment	 decisions.	 From	 these	 basic	 premises	 it	 follows	 that	 the	













	 The	 premise	 that	 embodiment	 in	 physical	 capital	 goods	 is	 necessary	 to	 implement	
changes	in	the	technologies	that	would	lower	the	global	production	regime’s	carbon‐intensity,	as	
well	 as	 to	 increase	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 carbon‐based	 capital	 stock,	 therefore	 is	 a	 distinctive	
feature	of	the	modelling	approach	pursued	here.	 	Although	energy	technologists	and	engineers	
have	 in	 effect	 long	 recognized	 that	 the	 “embodiment”	 of	 techniques	 in	 fixed	 reproducible	
structures	 and	 equipment	 cannot	 be	 ignored	 when	 considering	 the	 impact	 of	 technical	
innovations	in	energy	supply	systems,19	our	explicit	recognition	of	this	in	the	very	structure	of	
the	model	 presented	 here	 (and	 its	 account	 of	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 optimal	 climate‐stabilizing	
transition	path)	represents	a	major	departure	from	the	ways	in	which	the	effects	of	endogenous	




production	 technologies.	 Several	 points	 of	 comparison	 with	 the	 present	 analysis	 are	 worth	
remarking	upon	 in	regard	 to	 three	notable	preceding	contributions	 in	 this	vein,	 	by	Tahvonen	
and	Salo	(2001),	Valente	(2009)	and	Schumacher	(2011),21	Tahvonen	and	Salo	(2001)	focus	on	
the	 timing	 of	 the	 switch	 between	 alternative	 resource	 extraction	 technologies	 that	 differed	 in	
their	 variable	 costs,	 whereas	 Valente	 (2009)	 examines	 the	 switch	 between	 two	 macro‐
production	 technologies	 in	 a	 setting	 without	 irreversibility	 of	 investments	 in	 production	
capacity	nor	endogenous	technical	changes	resulting	from	investments	in	R&D.		The	location	of	a	
single	 optimal	 switching	moment	 in	Valente’s	 (2009)	 analysis	 is	 found	 in	 a	 standard	dynamic	
optimization	setting	using	a	CIES	utility	function.		By	contrast,	our	supposition	that	formation	of	
physical	 production	 capacity	 embodying	 each	 technology	 must	 have	 occurred	 before	 that	
                                                            
19	The	development	and	use	of	energy	technologies	is	viewed	as	an	integrated	system	comprising	research	discoveries	
and	 inventions,	 the	 creation	 of	 commercial	 products	 and	 processes,	 their	 initial	 deployment	 and	 adoption	 into	
commercial	operations,	and	subsequent	wider	diffusion	–	the	view	embraced	recently	by	the	Report	of	the	President’s	
Council	 of	 Advisors	 on	 Science	 and	 Technology	 (PCAST,	 2012).	 	 Accordingly,	 Ernest	 Moniz	 (2012:	 p.	 82),	 former	
Undersecretary	of	the	U.S.	Department	of	Energy	and	a	PCAST	member,	emphasizes	the	importance	of	tangible	fixed	
capital	 formation	 in	 considering	 policies	 designed	 to	 stimulate	 “energy	 technology	 innovation”:	 	 “Adoption	 and	
diffusion	are	the	stages	at	which	materiality	of	[novel]	products	and	processes	are	realized	(or	not).	Innovation,	as	I	
use	it	here,	refers	to	the	end‐to‐end	system	including	market	diffusion,	not	front‐end	R&D	alone.”			
20	 One	may	 compare	 the	 implicit	 assumption	 –	 common	 to	 each	 of	 the	 following	 salient	 research	 contribution	 on	
endogenous	 technological	 change	and	climate	policy	analysis	 ‐‐	 that	 innovations	resulting	 from	R&D	or	 learning	by	
doing	 are	 of	 the	 disembodied	 kind,	 	 and	 	 therefore	 their	 effects	 are	 not	 intermediated	 by	 timing	 and	 volume	 of	
investments	 in	tangible	capital	 formation:	Goulder	and	Schneider	(1999),	Nordhaus	(2002),	Bounanno,	Carraro	and	




intensity.	 	While	 commenting	 on	 several	 aspects	of	 an	 	 earlier	 literature	 review	 	by	Azar	 and	Dowlatabadi	 (1999),	
Gillingham	et	al.	(2008)	gives	no	notice	of	its	useful	discussion	of	the	evidence	documenting		the	comparatively	slow	
pace	of	technology	diffusion	in	the	energy	sector,		the	responsiveness	of	private	adoption	decisions	there	to	changes	in	
performance	 standards	 and	 subsidies,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 infrastructure	 externalities	 and	 uncertainty	 in	 setting	 	 high	
hurdle	rates	of	return	required	for	lumpy	investments.			
21	A	recent	addition	to	the	theoretical	 literature	by	Boucekkine	et	al.	(2012)	provides	the	mathematical	foundations	





the	 implication	that	at	 least	 two	optimal	switching	moments	must	be	considered,	even	though	
only	two	technologies	are	involved	in	the	switch.22		Schumacher	(2011)	focusses	on	the	timing	of	
a	 switch	 towards	production	based	upon	a	 renewable	 resource	 that	would	be	 induced	 by	 the	
increasing	 probability	 of	 climate	 disasters	 under	 a	 non‐renewable	 production	 regime.	 	 His	
analysis,	however,	posits	a	production	structure	in	which	renewables	and	non‐renewables	form	
a	 ‘complex’	 of	 perfectly	 substitutable	 inputs	 that,	 together	 with	 ‘generic’	 capital,	 produce	 the	
economy’s	 aggregate	 output.	 Schumacher	 thus	 ignores	 the	 embodiment	 of	 technologies	 in	
specific	types	of	capital	goods,	and	suppresses	consideration	of	the	need	for	a	sufficient	amount	




	 The	 organization	 of	 the	 presentation	 that	 follows	 is	 straight‐forward.	 Section	 2	
introduces	 the	 basic	 form	 and	 features	 of	 the	 multi‐phase	 optimum	 control	 model	 (in	 sub‐
section	2.1)	and	describes	the	two	ways	in	which	it	 is	extended	in	this	paper.	The	Basic	Model	
(BAM	 for	 short)	 captures	 the	 essential	 features	 of	 the	 transition	 problem	 of	 an	 economy	 that	
must	 complete	 the	 switch	 from	 initial	 dependence	 on	 production	 facilities	 that	 embody	 a	
carbon‐using	 technology	 to	 producing	 exclusively	 with	 capital	 that	 embodies	 a	 “carbon‐free”	
technology,	 i.e.,	 one	 that	 enables	 it	 to	 utilize	 only	 non‐carbon	 sources	 of	 energy.	 Sub‐sections	
2.2‐2.3	set	out	the	formal	structure	and	the	analysis	of	the	optimal	dynamics	of	this	transition	‐‐	
which	must	 be	 completed	before	 the	CO2	 emitted	 in	 the	process	has	pushed	 the	 atmospheric	
concentration	of	GHG	to	the	(TPIRCC)	level	that	would	trigger	a	catastrophically	unstable	climate	
regime.	 The	 inter‐temporal	 optimization	 described	 in	 sub‐section	 2.4	 involves	 solving	 the	
“stacked	Hamiltonians”	 (in	 2.5)	 to	 obtain	 the	 durations	 of	 the	 three	 phases	mentioned	 above	
(see	footnote	22),	and	the	magnitude	of	the	sequenced	tangible	investments	required	to	build	up	
each	 of	 the	 kinds	 production	 facilities,	 utilize	 them	 jointly	 and	 eventually	 shut	 down	 un‐
depreciated	 fossil‐fueled	 capacity	 before	 entering	 the	 final	 phase	 of	 sustainable	 “green”	
economic	growth	in	a	stabilized	climate	system.		
	 Section	3	sets	out	the	formal	structure	and	analysis	of	the	two	models	that	extend	BAM.	
The	 introduction	 of	 endogenous	 R&D‐driven	 capital	 augmenting	 changes	 in	 the	 carbon‐free	
technology	prior	 to	 its	 embodiment	 and	deployment	 is	 shown	 (in	 3.1)	 to	 result	 in	 a	modified	
three‐phase	 model,	 referred	 to	 as	 “BAM+R&D”.	 A	 third	 model,	 labeled	 “BAM+R&D+UCL”	 is	
obtained	(in	3.2)	by	adding	a	climate	change	feedback	effect	in	the	form	of	heightened	expected	
annual	 rates	 of	 damage	 to	 the	 extant	 capital	 stock	 ‐‐	 driven	 by	 the	 rising	 atmospheric	
concentration	of	CO2,	the	consequent	warming	of	the	earth’s	surface	and	increasing	moisture	in	
the	atmosphere	due	to	the	faster	evaporation	from	the	oceans’	surface,	bringing	more	frequent	
severe	storms,	seaboard	and	riverine	 flooding	and	droughts	 in	 interior	regions.	The	onset	of	a	
higher	 expected	 (proportional)	 rate	 of	 “unscheduled	 capital	 losses”	 (UCLs)	 as	 the	 direct	 and	
indirect	 consequences	of	 damages	 to	 reproducible	 capital	 and	 ecosystem	services,	 is	modeled	
here	simply	as	endogenous	 jump	 in	 the	capital	 stock’s	 rate	of	 technical	decay,	 triggered	when	








tipping	point	(TPIRCC)	which	 is	specified	uniformly	 for	BAM	and	successive	extensions	of	 that	
model.			
	 Section	4	describes	 the	calibration	of	 the	 three	models	 (in	4.1).	We	comment	 there	on	
the	 quantitative	 implications	 of	 two	 specifications	 and	 one	 parameter	 assumption	 that	 have	
been	made	to	simplify	the	computational	solutions	of	these	models,	and	which	together	yield	an	
“optimistic”	impression	of	the	resource	mobilization	challenges	that	climate	stabilization	would	
pose	 even	 under	 the	 DIRAM’s	 idealized	 “social	 planning”	 assumptions.	 	With	 that	 caveat,	 the	
following	 three	 sub‐sections	 (4.2	 –	 4.4)	 turn	 present	 the	 optimal	 solutions	 obtained	 for	 the	
transition	 path	 of	 BAM	 and	 the	 two	 extensions	 of	 that	 model,	 along	 with	 the	 corresponding	
results	for	each	version	of	some	parameter	sensitivity	experiments.	
	 	The	paper	concludes	in	section	5	with	a	summary	of	the	salient	findings	that	emphasizes	
the	 intricate	 dynamics	 of	 the	 multi‐phase	 transition	 path	 which	 result	 from	 explicit	
consideration	of	the	investments	required	to	first	improve	and	then	deploy	non‐fossil‐fuel	based	
technologies	 that	 are	 embodied	 in	 durable	 tangible	 capital	 goods.	 We	 then	 comment	 on	 the	
implications	of	having	 re‐formulated	 the	problem	of	designing	a	 ‘tech‐fix’	 climate	 stabilization	
policy	as	one	of	 spending	 that	 entire	 “allowable	budget”	of	GHG	emissions	 (in	CO2‐equivalent	
ppmv)	on	the	transition	to	a	carbon	free	global	production	regime	that	is	social	welfare	optimal	‐










classes	 of	 (linear)	 technologies.	 One	 of	 them	 is	 an	 established	 technology	 (called	 the	 A‐
technology)	with	a	relatively	high	productivity	of	capital	that	uses	carbon‐based	energy	and	that	
produces	CO2	emissions	in	the	process.	As	stated,	these	emissions	add	to	the	stock	of	GHG’s	and	
so	 affect	 the	 probability	 of	 the	world	 getting	 into	 a	 situation	 of	 runaway	 global	warming	 and	
catastrophe	 in	 the	 end.	 The	 alternative	 technology	 (further	 called	 the	B‐technology)	 does	 not	
generate	CO2	emissions,	 but	has	 a	 relatively	 low	 capital	 productivity	 that	needs	 to	be	 further	





corresponding	 capacity	 of	 the	 capital	 stock	 embodying	 technologies	 permitting	 reliance	 on		
renewable,	 non‐carbon	 energy	 sources.	 In	 this	 framework,	 the	 variables	 A	 and	 B	 denote	 the	
respective	average	productivities	of	the	two	kinds	of	capital	goods.	We	proceed	by	formulating	a	
sequential	 Hamiltonian	 system	 that	 describes	 three	 distinct	 phases	 in	 the	 transition	 from	
carbon‐based	 to	 carbon‐free	production.	 In	 the	 first	 phase,	 called	 the	 business‐as‐usual	phase	
(BAU	 for	 short),	 only	 the	 already	 existing	 AK	 production	 capacity	 is	 active,	 and	 in	 the	 Basic	
Model	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 during	 the	 BAU	 phase	 the	 technical	 innovations	 needed	 to	 create	




capital	 that	 embodies	 the	 carbon‐using	 technology.	 	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 known	 alternative	
technologies	 would	 be	 relatively	 costly	 in	 terms	 of	 instantaneous	 consumption	 possibilities	
foregone,	and	that	disadvantage	is	not	perceived	to	be	offset	by	being	carbon‐free.	As	cumulative	
CO2	emissions	grow	with	 the	continuing	use	of	 the	A	 technology,	 the	 latter	becomes	ever	 less	
(socially)	 advantageous	 vis‐à‐vis	 the	 option	 to	 build	 and	 substitute	 capital	 embodying	 the	 B	
technology.			
Active	utilization	of	a	 technology	 implies	 two	 things.	First,	 the	basic	 features	of	 such	a	
technology	must	be	known,	while	secondly	these	features	are	embodied	in	new	capital	goods.	A	




In	 such	 a	 setting	 characterized	 by	 linear	 production	 technologies	 and	 linear	 cost	
functions,	it	can	be	shown	that	it	is	not	optimal	to	invest	in	both	technologies	at	the	same	time,	if	











The	 effects	 of	 the	 production	 and	 investment	 activities	 during	 the	 separate	 phases	








In	 the	 BAU	 phase	 (which	 starts	 at	 t=TU=0),	 the	 cumulative	 emissions	 (labeled	 E)	 are	
increasing	 exponentially	 as	 the	 stock	 of	 carbon‐based	 capital	 is	 growing.	 In	 the	 JPR	 phase	
investment	in	technology	A	stops,	and	output	using	technology	A	(i.e.	YA)	is	at	its	maximum	level	
but	starts	to	decrease	over	time,	because	of	technical	decay.	The	stock	of	technology	B	capital	is	
built	 up	 from	 scratch	 starting	 with	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 JPR	 phase	 at	 t=TJ.	 Production	 using	
technology	 B	 (i.e.	 YB)	 is	 at	 full	 capacity	 and	 exponentially	 increasing	 during	 the	 JPR	 phase.	
Cumulative	emissions	are	still	increasing,	albeit	at	a	decreasing	rate	as	the	stock	of	carbon‐based	
capital	is	run	down.	During	the	JPR	phase,	total	output	is	still	growing,	but	at	a	slower	rate	than	
the	 growth	 of	YB.	 Phase	CFR	 starts	when	 cumulative	 emissions	E	 hit	 (at	 t=TF)	 the	 cumulative	
emissions	threshold	atܧത,	just	below	the	climate	catastrophe	tipping	point.	During	the	final	phase,	
only	 investments	 capital	 goods	 embodying	 technology	 B	 are	 possible	 and	 carbon‐based	
production	must	stop	completely	even	though	there	is	un‐depreciated	capacity	of	the	latter	type.	










assumption	 that	 the	 social	 planning	 agent	 has	 internalized	 consumers’	 relative	 aversion	 to	
negative	 consumption	 shocks	 (i.e.,	 their	 representative	 “felicity	 function”	 has	 a	 positive	
coefficient	of	relative	risk	aversion,	i.e.,	 >	0),	and	therefore	the	optimization	of	social	welfare	
seeks	 to	smooth	changes	 in	 the	 level	of	consumption	over	 time	as	much	as	possible,	given	the	
macroeconomic	and	climate	system	constraints.	From	TF	onwards	the	world	economy	is	“green”	
(having	 entered	 the	CRF	phase),	 and	will	 have	 to	 grow	 at	 a	 relatively	 slower	pace	 due	 to	 the	
higher	unit	cost	of	capital	embodying	the	carbon‐free	technology.	.	
In	addition	to	the	Basic	Model,	the	follow	section	formulates	two	models	that	extend	it	in	
two	 directions,	 sequentially	 incorporating,	 first,	 another	 technology	 policy	 option	 and,	 next,	
introducing	 an	 adverse	 feedback	 effect	 from	 the	 climate	 system.	 In	 the	 second	 version	 of	 the	
transition	model	 that	will	 be	 analyzed,	 the	 productivity	 of	 capital	 embodying	 the	 carbon‐free	
technology	 can	 be	 raised	 through	 (endogenously	 determined)	 R&D	 expenditures	 before	




expected	 rates	 of	 weather‐related	 physical	 damages	 that	 result	 in	 “unscheduled	 losses”	 of	
services	 from	 the	 global	 stock	 of	 capital.	 The	 latter	 regime‐shift	 is	 modeled	 simply	 as	 an	
endogenously	timed	one‐time	jump	in	the	total	annual	rate	of	scheduled	physical	depreciation	
plus	“unscheduled	capital	 losses”	(UCL).	Being	anticipated,	this	 impending	state	change	will	be	







The	 endogenous	 growth	 framework	 of	 BAM	 borrows	 heavily	 from	 the	 AK‐model	 by	
Rebelo	(1991).	However,	contrary	to	the	original	AK‐setting,	we	distinguish	between	two	types	
of	capital:	carbon‐based,	or	black,	capital	further	denoted	by	KA	and	carbon‐free,	or	green,	capital	
further	 denoted	 by	KB.	 The	 capital	 stocks	 in	 this	model	 are	 subjected	 to	 exponential	 decay	 at	
rates	ߜ௫,	for	ݔ ∈ ሼܣ, ܤሽ.	Because	of	the	linearity	of	the	production	functions	in	an	AK‐setting,	and	
since	 one	 unit	 of	 capital	 takes	 one	 unit	 of	 consumption	 foregone	 for	 the	 two	 technologies	
distinguished,	 it	 follows	 that	 there	will	always	by	 investment	 in	 just	one	 type	of	 capital	at	 the	
time.	Hence,	gross	investment	in	a	particular	technology	is	either	equal	to	zero,	or	it	is	equal	to	





Activities	 BAU	Phase		 JPR	Phase		 CFR	Phase		
Investment	 ܫ஺ ൐ 0	 ܫ஻ ൐ 0	 ܫ஻ ൐ 0	
Production	 ஺ܻ ൌ ܣ. ܭ஺	 ஺ܻ ൌ ܣ. ܭ஺	
஻ܻ ൌ ܤ. ܭ஻	
஺ܻ ൌ 0	
஻ܻ ൌ ܤ. ܭ஻	
Capital	
Accumulation	
ܭ஺ሶ ൌ ஺ܻ െ ߜ஺. ܭ஺ െ ܥ	 ܭ஺ሶ ൌ െߜ஺. ܭ஺	
ܭ஻ሶ ൌ ஺ܻ ൅ ஻ܻ െ ߜ஻. ܭ஻ െ ܥ
ܭ஻ሶ ൌ ஻ܻ െ ߜ஻. ܭ஻ െ ܥ	




In	this	table,	Ix	refers	to	the	amount	of	investment	in	capital	of	type	x,	where	ݔ ∈ ሼܣ, ܤሽ	
refers	 to	 ‘Carbon‐based’	capital	and	carbon‐free	capital,	 respectively.	Similarly,	Yx	 refers	 to	the	




use	with	 a	 constant	 factor	 of	 proportion	 ߝ௫	 for	 ݔ ∈ ሼܣ, ܤሽ.	 Obviously,	 ߝ஻ ൌ 0.	 Note	 that	 when	
























ch.7).	 This	 is	 the	 situation	 that	 is	 of	 direct	 relevance	 in	 our	 case,	 since	 we	 do	 not	 know	 on	
beforehand	 when	 the	 next	 phase	 will	 start.	 However,	 on	 an	 optimum	 path,	 postponing	 or	
extending	a	particular	phase	by	an	infinitesimal	amount	of	time	shouldn’t	change	the	valuation	
of	the	entire	path.	L&VL	show	that	the	derivative	of	the	value	function	(in	our	case	the	present	
value	of	 total	welfare)	with	respect	 to	 the	 terminal	date	(of	a	phase)	matches	 the	value	of	 the	
Hamiltonian	 at	 that	 date.	 This	 makes	 sense,	 as	 the	 Hamiltonian	 at	 some	 moment	 in	 time	
measures	the	contribution	to	the	value	function	of	the	optimal	use	of	all	resources	available	at	








phase	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 opportunity	 cost	 of	 that	 expansion.	 In	 practice,	 the	 equality	 of	 the	
Hamiltonians	evaluated	under	the	conditions	relevant	in	either	of	the	phases	just	before	and	just	
after	a	phase	change,	will	 result	 in	a	 condition	 that	needs	 to	be	met	by	a	set	of	 states	and	co‐
states	evaluated	at	the	moment	of	the	phase‐change.	
The	differences	 in	 the	nature	of	 the	activities	at	 the	moment	of	a	phase	change	can	be	
used	to	implicitly	describe	the	conditions	that	should	be	met	at	the	moment	of	a	phase	change.	
For	example,	at	 t=TF	 it	must	be	 the	case	 that	carbon‐based	capital	 is	deactivated.	For	 t>=TF	it	





The	overall	welfare	 function	 consists	 of	 a	 summation	 of	 integral	welfare	 derived	 from	
the	flow	of	consumption	during	the	three	phases	distinguished	in	BAM:	
	




























are	 relevant	 in	 each	 phase,	 by	 the	 stocks	 inherited	 from	previous	 phases,	 the	 tangible	 capital	
formation	constraint		
	
	 	 ( )A A AK A K C R     ,		 	 	 	 		 	 	 (2)	
cand	by	 the	 thresholds	 that	are	relevant	during	 the	various	phases.	We	will	now	solve	
the	Hamiltonian	problems	for	each	individual	phase.	
The	BAU	phase	










డ஼ೆ ൌ ݁ିఘ∙௧ ∙ ሺܥ௎ሻିఏ െ ߣ௄ಲ௎ ൌ 0 ⇒ ܥ௎ ൌ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಲ௎ ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ	 	 	 	 (4)	
డுೆ
డ௄ಲೆ
ൌ ߣ௄ಲ௎ ∙ ሺܣ െ ߜ஺ሻ ൅ ߣா௎ ∙ ߝ஺ ൌ െߣሶ௄ಲ௎ 		 	 	 	 	 	 (5)	
డுೆ
డாೆ ൌ 0 ൌ െߣሶா௎	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (6)	
డுೆ
డఒ಼ಲೆ
ൌ ܭ஺௎ሶ ൌ ൬ሺܣ െ ߜ஺ሻ ∙ ܭ஺௎ െ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಲ௎ ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ൰	 	 	 	 	 (7)	
డுೆ
డఒಶೆ ൌ ܧ
௎ሶ ൌ ߝ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௎	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (8)	
	
Equation	 (7)	 is	 obtained	 by	 means	 of	 substitution	 of	 equation	 (4)	 into	 the	 macro‐
economic	 budget	 constraint	 which	 states	 that	 output	 is	 used	 for	 consumption	 and	 (gross)	
investment	 purposes.	 Equations	 (5)‐(8)	 constitute	 a	 simultaneous	 system	 of	 differential	
equations	 that	can	be	solved	 forward	 in	 time,	given	a	set	of	 initial	values	 for	 the	various	state	









ܪ௃ ൌ ௘షഐ∙೟∙ሺ஼಻ሻభషഇሺଵିఏሻ ൅ ߣ௄ಲ
௃ ∙ ൫െߜ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௃൯ ൅ ߣ௄ಳ௃ ∙ ቀሺܤ െ ߜ஻ሻ ∙ ܭ஻௃ ൅ ܣ ∙ ܭ஺௃ െ ܥ௃ቁ ൅ ߣா௃ ∙ ߝ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௃							.		(9)	
	
As	in	the	BAU	phase,	we	have	just	one	control,	 i.e.	C	 J,	but	three	states	KA,	KB	and	E	and	





డ஼಻ ൌ ݁ିఘ∙௧ ∙ ሺܥ௃ሻିఏ െ ߣ௄ಳ
௃ ൌ 0 ⇒ ܥ௃ ൌ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಳ௃ ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ	 	 	 	 (10)	
డு಻
డ௄ಲ಻
ൌ ߣ௄ಲ௃ ∙ െߜ஺ ൅ ߣ௄ಳ௃ ∙ ܣ ൅ ߣா௃ ∙ ߝ஺ ൌ െߣሶ௄ಲ௃ 	 	 	 	 	 	 (11)	
డு಻
డ௄ಳ಻
ൌ ߣ௄ಳ௃ ∙ ሺܤ െ ߜ஻ሻ ൌ െߣሶ௄ಳ௃ 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (12)	
డு಻
డா಻ ൌ 0 ൌ െߣሶா
௃ 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (13)	
డு಻
డఒ಼ಲ
಻ ൌ ܭ஺௃ሶ ൌ െߜ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௃	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (14)	
డு಻
డఒ಼ಳ
಻ ൌ ܭ஻௃ሶ ൌ ሺܤ െ ߜ஻ሻ ∙ ܭ஻௃ ൅ ܣ ∙ ܭ஺௃ െ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಳ௃ ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ		 	 	 	 (15)	
డு಻
డఒಶ಻
ൌ ܧ௃ሶ ൌ ߝ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௃	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (16)	
	
Equation	(15)	is	again	obtained	by	means	of	substitution	of	optimum	consumption	levels	
(as	 given	by	 equation	 (10))	 into	 the	macro‐economic	 budget	 constraint.	 	As	before,	 equations	
(11)‐(16)	constitute	a	simultaneous	system	of	differential	equations	that	can	be	solved	forward	









Phase	 F	 differs	 from	 phase	 J	 in	 that	 the	 carbon‐based	 capital	 stock	 is	 discarded,	 and	
consequently	the	flow	of	CO2	emissions	drops	to	zero.	From	t=TF	production	is	totally	“green”.	
The	present	value	Hamiltonian	for	phase	F,	i.e.	HF,	is	now	given	by:		






డ஼ಷ ൌ ݁ିఘ∙௧ ∙ ሺܥிሻିఏ െ ߣ௄ಳி ൌ 0 ⇒ ܥி ൌ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಳி ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ	 	 	 	 (18)	
డுಷ
డ௄ಳಷ ൌ ߣ௄ಳ
ி ∙ ሺܤ െ ߜ஻ሻ ൌ െߣሶ௄ಳி 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (19)	
డுಷ
డாಷ ൌ 0 ൌ െߣሶா
௃ 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (20)	
డுಷ
డఒ಼ಳಷ
ൌ ܭ஻ிሶ ൌ ሺܤ െ ߜ஻ሻ ∙ ܭ஻ி െ ൛݁ఘ∙௧ ∙ ߣ௄ಳி ൟ
ିଵ/ఏ	 	 	 	 	 	 (21)	
డுಷ
డఒಶಷ ൌ ܧ
ிሶ ൌ 0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (22)	
	
As	 before,	 equation	 (21)	 is	 obtained	 by	 substituting	 equation	 (18)	 into	 the	 macro‐





values	 for	 the	 states	 and	 co‐states	 are	 implicitly	 described	 by	 the	 standard	 transversality	






For	 the	CFR	phase	 the	 standard	 transversality	 condition	 (further	 called	TVC	 for	 short)	
applies	regarding	the	value	of	carbon‐free	capital	at	time	infinity:	
	































ఘାሺఏିଵሻሺ஻ିஔ୆ሻ 	 .	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (27)	
When	substituting	(26)	into	(24),	we	find	that:	
	
ܭ஻,௧ி ൌ ܭ஻,்ிி ∙ ݁
ሺಳషಌాషഐሻሺ೟ష೅ಷሻ
ഇ 	 .	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (28)	
	
It	follows	from	(28)	that	if	the	structural	parameters	are	such	that	(265)	is	met	and	if	we	
pick	 consumption	at	 time	TF	 (hence	ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷி 	 (see	equation	 (16))	 such	 that	 (27)	 is	met,	 then	 the	
carbon‐free	 capital	 stock	will	 grow	 at	 the	 steady	 state	 growth	 rate	 ሺܤ െ δB െ ߩሻ/ߠ	 from	 time	
t=TF.	
Apart	from	the	TVC	above,	we	require	that:	
ߣ௄ಲ,೅ಷ௃ ൌ 0		 ,	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (29)	
	
which	sets	the	shadow	price	of	carbon‐based	capital	to	zero	at	the	end	of	the	JPR	phase	(i.e.,	at	




Lastly,	 there	are	 two	TVCs	 that	pertain	 to	 the	optimum	 length	of	 the	BAU	and	 the	 JPR	
phase,	and	that	require	the	equality	of	the	Hamiltonians	of	the	various	phases	at	different	points	
in	 time.	 For	 the	 optimum	 length	 of	 the	 BAU	 phase	 (given	 by	 the	 value	 of	 TJ,	 since	 TU=0	 by	
assumption),	we	must	 have	 	ܪ்௃௎ ൌ ܪ்௃௃ 	 25,	whereas	 the	 optimum	 start	 date	 for	 the	 F	 phase	 is	





	ߣ௄ಲ,೅಻௃ ൌ ߣ௄ಳ,೅಻௃ 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (30)	
	










matched	 by	 the	 cost	 of	 doing	 that,	which	 is	 shown	on	 the	 equation’s	 RHS:	 one	 unit	 of	 capital	
produces	ߝ஺	units	of	CO2	emissions,	each	at	a	marginal	social	cost	of	െߣா,்ி௃ 	26.	Equation	(31)	is	






be	 solved,	 as	 the	 initial	 and	 terminal	 values	we	have	available	 for	 the	 state	variables,	 and	 the	
TVCs	that	provide	either	some	fixed	points	for	the	time	paths	of	the	co‐states	(cf.	equation	(29)),	
or	 link	 the	co‐states	 to	a	state‐variable	which	 time	path	has	been	 fixed	 through	a	given	 initial	
value	(cf.	equation	(27)),	or	that	links	different	co‐states	at	some	point	in	time	(cf.	equations	(30)	














pieces	of	information.	We	have	initial	values	available	for	ܭ஺,଴௎ ൌ ܭഥ஺,଴௎ 	,		ܭ஻,்௃௃ ൌ 0	,	and	ܧ଴௎ ൌ ܧത଴௎.	




ߣ௄ಲ,బ௎ , ߣா௎	 and	 TJ,	 given	 the	 initial	 values	 of	 ܭ஺,଴௎ 	 	 and	 ܧ଴௎.	 The	 solution	 of	 SU	 then	 provides	
terminal	values	 for	 	ߣ௄ಲ,೅಻௎ 	 	and	 	ߣா,்௃௎ 	 that,	on	account	of	 the	continuity	of	 states	and	co‐states	
give	 rise	 to	 initial	 values	 for	 SJ,	 since	 we	 must	 have	 that	 ߣ௄ಲ,೅಻௎ ൌ ߣ௄ಲ,೅಻௃ 	 ,	 	 ߣா,்௃௎ ൌ ߣா,்௃௃ ,	
ܭ஺,்௃௃ ൌ ܭ஺,்௃௎ 		,	ܭ஻,்௃௃ ൌ 0,	ܧ்௃௃ ൌ ܧ்௃௎ .		We	only	need	an	initial	value	for	ߣ௄ಳ,೅಻௃ 		as	well	as	an	a	priori	
value	for	TF	to	be	able	to	calculate	SJ	forward	in	time.		That	initial	value	is	provided	by	the	TVCs	
listed	in	equation	(30).	Given	the	a	priori	values	for		ߣ௄ಲ,బ௎ , ߣா௎	,		TJ	and	finally	TF,	we	are	able	to	
calculate	 the	 terminal	 values	 for	 ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷ௃ 	 ,	 ߣா,்ி௃ 	 ,	 ܭ஻,்ி௃ 	 	 and	 ܧ்ி௃ 	 ,	 which,	 again	 using	 the	
requirement	 of	 the	 continuity	 of	 states	 and	 co‐states,	 imply	 that	 ܭ஻,்ிி ൌ ܭ஻,்ி௃ ,	 	ܧ்ிி ൌ ܧ்ி௃ ,	
ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷி ൌ ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷ௃ 	 and	 ߣா,்ிி ൌ ߣா,்ி௃ .		 	 The	 time	 paths	 thus	 obtained	 for	 all	 states	 and	 co‐states,	






that	 case	 a	 search	algorithm	such	as	 the	 steepest	descent	method	 (which	we	have	been	using	






This	 section	 describes	 the	 modifications	 of	 the	 basic	 3‐phase	 model	 that	 extend	 the	
structure	 of	 BAM	 in	 two	ways.	 The	 first	 introduces	 the	 option	 of	 investment	 in	 research	 and	





link	 the	various	 initial	 and	 terminal	 conditions	as	well	 as	 the	values	of	TJ	 and	TF	 together	 through	a	simultaneous	
system	 of	 non‐linear	 equations.	 Using	 that	 system,	 we	 were	 able	 to	 find	 the	 fixed	 points	 for	 all	 time	 paths	 by	
numerically	 solving	 the	 non‐linear	 system	 for	 the	 fixed	 points.	 The	 time	 paths	 for	 each	 of	 the	 state	 and	 co‐state	
variables	 could	 then	 be	 obtained	 by	 substituting	 the	 numerical	 values	 thus	 found	 for	 the	 fixed	 points	 into	 the	
analytical	solutions	of	all	time	paths	involving	these	fixed	points.	This	procedure	proved	to	work,	but	is	rather	tedious	
and	time	consuming	and	it’s	feasibility	depended	crucially	on	the	simplicity	of	the	model.	Minor	deviations	from	the	
AK‐set‐up	 proved	 to	 make	 using	 the	 analytical	 method	 infeasible.	 This	 provided	 a	 strong	 incentive	 to	 use	 the	
sequential	numerical	solution	method	outlined	in	the	main	text.	Both	methods	do	generate	the	same	results,	as	they	
should,	 but	 the	 sequential	 numerical	 method	 is	 much	 more	 efficient	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 obtaining	 the	 system	 of	
differential	equations	to	be	solved,	and	finding	the	solution.	Nonetheless,	more	work	is	needed	to	improve	upon	the	
rather	 crude	 steepest	 descent	 search	 routine	 that	 we	 are	 employing	 at	 the	 moment.	 The	 latter	 converges	 rather	
slowly,	 if	at	all,	 for	 the	more	 intricate	versions	of	the	model	extensions	we	have	built	up	to	date	and	which	are	not	









To	 introduce	 R&D	 investment‐driven	 endogenous	 technical	 changes	 affecting	 the	
economic	 performance	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	 technology,	we	 posit	 that	 these	will	 be	 confined	 to	
raising	 the	 average	 (and	 marginal)	 productivity	 of	 the	 capital	 goods	 that	 embodies	 the	 new	
technology.	 	 The	 latter	 lowers	 the	 real	 unit	 cost	 of	 carbon‐free	 production	 capacity	 by	
irreversibly	raising	B	above	its	initial	value	in	the	opening	(BAU)	phase,	and	doing	so	prior	to	the	






proportional	 rate	 of	 change	 in	 total	 input	 productivity	 upon	 the	 flow	 of	 R&D	 expenditures	 is	
described	by	a	simple	functional	relationship	of	the	following	form:		
	
	 B R B   	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (32)	
	
where	 R	 represents	 R&D	 resources	 measured	 here	 as	 consumption	 foregone.	 But,	 with	 the	
linear,	 single‐factor	 specification	 of	 the	 AK	 model’s	 production	 function,	 the	 average	 (and	
marginal)	 productivity	 of	 capital	 remains	 constant	 as	 the	 economy	 accumulates	 capital.	 No	
contributions	 from	 increases	 in	 other	 factors	 of	 production	 (say,	 the	 state	 of	 technical	
knowledge,	or	human	capital)	are	needed	to	prevent	the	capital	stock’s	growth	from	driving	its	
marginal	 productivity	 downwards.	 Were	 a	 specification	 such	 as	 (32)	 to	 be	 introduced	 in	 a	









	 ( )B R B B    	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (33)	
	
where	 B 	 is	 the	 fixed	asymptotic	value	of	capital	productivity,	and	 0  	and	 0 1  	are	also	
constant.30	 	 Starting	 out	 with	 a	 basic	 technical	 design	 that	 permits	 productivity	 to	 be	 at	 B0,
                                                            
29	This	follows	from	the	fact	that	with	a	constant	level	of		R	in	equation		(33)	the	rising	level	of	capital’s	marginal	(and	










00 B B  	 the	marginal	product	of	R&D	 investment	will	be	 falling	as	R	 increases	and	B	 rises	
towards	its	upper	bound.		
	 	Several	 features	 of	 this	 specification	 argue	 for	 its’	 use	 in	 the	 present	 applications	
context.		Firstly,	it	has	the	advantage	of	introducing	decreasing	returns	to	R&D	in	a	setting	that,	
unlike	 the	 conventional	 endogenous	 growth	 models,	 excludes	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 specific	
technology	 being	 rendered	 infinitely	 productive	 (and	 so	 resulting	 in	 infinitely	 rapid	 growth)	
merely	 by	 the	 application	 of	 more	 and	 more	 massive	 R&D	 expenditures	 at	 any	 particular	
moment	in	time.31		Allowing	decreasing	marginal	returns	in	R&D	recognizes	that	at	a	given	stage	
in	 the	advance	of	knowledge	 the	 state	of	 fundamental	 scientific	understanding	of	 the	physical	
processes	involved	may	still	be	inadequate	to	permit	the	effective	application	of	more	and	more	
resources	to	the	solution	of	a	particular	practical	problem	‐‐	such	as	the	further	improvement	of	
the	 productivity	 of	 a	 particular	 class	 of	 technology‐embodying	 capital	 facilities.32	 That	 more	
restrictive	view	of	the	transformative	power	of	 investment	in	R&D	is	appropriate	also	because	
the	 concern	 in	 this	 context	 is	 not	 with	 the	 undirected	 global	 expansion	 of	 the	 technological	
opportunity	 set	 typically	 envisaged	 in	 theoretical	 growth	 models.	 Rather,	 the	 aim	 of	 the			
“directed	R&D”	in	the	present	model	is	to	enhance	the	economic	properties	of	particular	kinds	of	
process	 inventions,	 with	 new	 product	 inventions	 only	 insofar	 as	 alterations	 in	 product	
characteristics	 are	 consequential	 for	 raising	 the	 efficiency	 of	 capital	 inputs	 into	 carbon‐free	
production	processes.33			
	 Introducing	 (33)	 into	 the	Basic	Model	 requires	 a	 number	 of	modifications:	 the	 first	 of	
these	 extends	 the	 Hamiltonian	 by	 adding	 the	 value	 of	 increases	 in	 B	 due	 to	 R&D.	 Next,	 the			
macro‐economic	budget	constraint	that	describes	the	accumulation	of	capital	must	be	adjusted	




since	 it	 can	 change	 as	 long	 as	 R&D	 is	 taking	 place,	 but	must	 remain	 constant	 after	 R&D	 has	
ceased.	 Leonard	 and	Van	Long	 (1992:	Ch.7)	describe	how	 the	 latter	 situation	 can	be	handled.	
Their	 approach	 is	 to	 regard	 the	 Hamiltonian	 as	 a	 function	 of	 B,	 i.e.,	H(B),	 while	 substituting	
0B  	as	the	dynamic	constraint	on	B	during	the	phases	when	investments	in	R&D	are	not	made	
                                                                                                                                                                                         









32	Conceptually,	 this	 formulation	of	 the	effects	of	 investment	 in	R&D	activities	may	be	 thought	 to	 reflect	 a	Platonic	
world	 in	which	a	 finite	number	of	 solution	possibilities	 for	 technical	 transformations	 are	present	 from	 the	 start	 of	
time,	but	these	as	a	rule	will	not	reveal	themselves	spontaneously.		They	can	be	uncovered,	however,	and	formulated	
for	 practical	 application	 through	 costly	 research	 and	 development	 procedures	 based	 upon	 the	 existing	 state	 of	
fundamental	 scientific	 knowledge,	 rather	 than	 being	 created	 de	 novo	 and	 without	 limit	 by	 the	 expenditure	 of	
resources	in	the	performance	of	R&D	activities			
33	Following	this	interpretation,	adding	endogenous	technological	change	to	the	Basic	Model	allows	us	to	characterize	
the	optimal	path	of	global	R&D	 that	 is	directed	 to	 increasing	 the	productivity	of	green	capital.	 	Correspondingly,	 the	
impact	of	R&D	investment	on	economic	welfare	is	modeled	as	being	felt	indirectly,	rather	than	directly	in	the	form	of	












that	 would	 directly	 involve	 the	 trade‐off	 between	 R&D	 and	 other	 uses	 of	 output,	 like	
consumption	and	tangible	capital	investment.	
	 Note	that	it	can	be	shown	that	once	an	initial	value	for	 0B is	available,	then	it	pays	not	to	
wait	 to	 improve	 the	productivity	 of	 capital	 embodying	 carbon‐free	 technology	 by	 engaging	 in	
R&D	 (see	 Appendix	 A).	 Hence,	without	 loss	 of	 generality,	we	may	 assume	 that	 the	 basic	 idea	
underlying	the	carbon‐free	technology	is	available	from	t=TU=0.	In	that	case,	R&D	should	start	
at	t=TU,	and	it	should	stop	at	t=TJ,	that	being	the	moment	at	which	investment	in	the	formation	
of	 carbon‐free	 production	 capacity	 commences.	 Consequently,	 the	 BAM+R&D	 model	 has	 the	
same	number	of	phases	as	BAM.	For	the	BAU	phase,	assuming	that	R&D	is	done	from	the	very	
beginning,	the	three	following	equations	have	to	be	added:34	
		 	 ( )B R B B    ;	 /B H B    ;	 / 0H R   ,	 	 	 	 											(34)	
	
and	 the	 capital	 accumulation	 constraint	 takes	 the	 correspondingly	 modified	 form	 of	 eq.(2):			
	 	 	
	 ( )A A AK A K C R     	.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 											(35)	 	
		 Furthermore,	 the	 revised	 Hamiltonian	 for	 the	 BAU	 phase	 is	 now	 given	 by:
	 . 1 /(1 ) {( ) }t A A A BH e C A K C R B                 		 	.							 	 											(36)		
Since	an	additional	state	variable	has	been	introduced,	with	it	come	an	additional	TVC.	As	usual,	
we	 require	 that	 at	 infinity	 the	 present	 (utility)	 value	 of	 B	 should	 approach	 zero,	 i.e.	
,lim 0t B t tB    .	 However,	 t TJB B t TJ   ,	 since	 R&D	 has	 ceased	 at	 t=TJ	 which	 has	
turned	 B	 into	 a	 constant	 for	 t  .	 Consequently,	 the	 additional	 TVC	 is	 reduced	 to	 the	
requirement	that	 ,lim 0t B t  .		Using	(25),	it	can	be	shown	that	the	latter	TVC	implies:	
	
ߣ஻,்ிி ൌ ܭ஻,்ிி ∙ ߣ௄ಳ,೅ಷி ∙ ఏሺ஻೅ಷಷ ିఋಳሻ∙ሺఏିଵሻାఘ		.	 	 	 	 	 											(37)	
	
It	 is	 hard	 to	 give	 a	 transparent	 interpretation	 of	 equation	 (37),	 and	 a	 fortiori,	 for	 the	
revised	version	of	the	transversality	condition	that	now	determines	the	optimum	length	of	the	
BAU	phase.	That	TVC	differs	from	the	corresponding	condition	in	BAM,	since	the	R&D	process	is	
active	 during	 the	 BAU	 phase	 and	 inactive	 during	 subsequent	 phases.	 Consequently,	 the	
Hamiltonians	of	 the	BAU	and	 JPR	phase	evaluated	at	 t=TJ	now	involve	 terms	coming	 from	the	
R&D	function	as	well	as	the	corresponding	co‐state	evaluated	at	t=TJ,	resulting	in	a	complicated	
expression	 linking	 the	 various	 states	 and	 co‐states	 together	 at	 t=TJ.35	 Note	 that	 (37)	 in	
                                                            
34	Note	 that	 for	 ease	 of	 notation	we	 have	 dropped	 the	 time	 subscript	 and	 the	 phase	 superscript	 except	where	 the	
presence	of	the	time	subscript	is	needed	for	clarity.	
35  Because	 it	 has	 resisted	 our	 attempts	 to	 give	 that	 mathematical	 expression	 an	 intelligibly	 simple	 economic	


















physical	 losses	 of	 capital	 services,	 in	 effect	 a	 jump	 in	 the	 decay	 parameter	 from	 the	 normal	
physical	 rate	of	 depreciation,	 takes	place	when	 that	 tipping	point	 is	 reached,	 thereby	splitting	
the	BAU	phase	 in	to	an	 initial	 “low	damage”	sub‐phase	and	the	subsequent	sub‐phase	of	 “high	
damages”.	All	 the	 phases	 following	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 the	BAU	phase	 are	 also	 characterized	by	















the	 incremental	 costs	of	 thereby	protecting	 its	 expected	marginal	 social	 rate	of	 return	 from	being	reduced	by	high	
physical	damanges	 and	 temporary	 “outages”.	 	 See	 also	Brock	 et	 al.(2012)	 for	 recent	modeling	of	 	 regional	 climatic	









assumed	to	be	disembodied	 in	 the	DICE	model,	mitigation	of	C02	 induced	by	rising	carbon	taxes)	does	not	require	
specific	 capital	 formation	 to	 achieve	 low	 or	 zero‐emissions	 production	 capacity.	 	 Consequently,	 in	 AD‐DICE	 CO2	
mitigation	costs	do	not	compete	directly	with	concurrent	adaptation	expenditures	 for	gross	 investment	allocations.		
Although	the	 two	policies	are	substitutes	when	 their	 inter‐temporal	 	 effects	are	considered,	because	effective	early	
mitigation	would	check	the	pace	of	warming	and		reduce	the	future	need	for	defensive	adaptations,	this	relationship	is	







choose	 the	moment	 at	 which	 the	 high	 damage	 sub‐phase	will	 arrive.	We	 can	 implement	 this	
again	by	requiring	that	the	Hamiltonians	evaluated	at	the	moment	of	arrival	of	the	high	damage	
sub	phase	will	be	the	same	immediately	before	and	after	its	arrival.	This	implies	that	this	model	
will	have	 four	different	phases	 instead	of	 three.	 It	 follows	 that	we	need	to	determine	an	extra	
phase	length	in	addition	to	the	size	of	the	jump	in	the	co‐state	for	cumulative	emissions	at	the	
time	of	arrival	of	 the	 first	high	damage	sub‐phase.	 In	addition	to	the	given	initial	and	terminal	
values	of	the	BAM+R&D	model	as	well	as	the	corresponding	transversality	conditions,	we	have	
an	 additional	 terminal	 value	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 location	 of	 the	 damage	 threshold	 itself,	 in	
combination	 with	 the	 requirement	 of	 the	 equality	 of	 the	 Hamiltonians	 at	 both	 sides	 of	 the	
damage	phase	change.	 It	 turns	out	 that	 the	 transversality	 condition	 for	 the	arrival	of	 the	high	
damage	sub	phase	during	the	BAU	phase	is	given	by:39	
	












unit	of	capital	remains	unchanged.	Since,	 in	effect,	 the	depreciation	costs	 (of	 the	carbon‐based		
capital	 stock)	 are	 higher	 after	 the	 jump,	 the	 marginal	 social	 costs	 of	 CO2	 emissions	 will	 be	

















shadow	 price	 when	 the	 high‐damage	 sub‐phase	 of	 the	 transition	 begins	 reflects	 the	 assumption	 that	 continued	









our	 DIRAM	 framework.	 Nordhaus	 (2010)	 updates	 the	 calibration	 of	 the	 essential	 neoclassical	




Therefore,	 in	order	 to	 reproduce	global	growth	rates	 and	saving	 rates	 that	have	about	












the	 premise	 that	 total	 output	 and	 (carbon‐based)	 capital	 stock	 are	 growing	 on	 a	 steady	 state	
path	 in	 the	BAU	phase,	at	an	annual	 rate	equal	 to	0.03436	(sic!),	 the	 following	condition	must	
hold:		
	









஺ ൌ 0.15.	The	latter	implies	that	ߜ ൌ 0.15 ∙ ܣ ൌ 0.15 ∙ 0.25 ൌ 0.0375.	
This	 value	 for	 the	 depreciation	 rate	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 much	 lower	 than	 the	 0.10	 rate	 used	 by		
Nordhaus.		Equation	(35)	implies	combinations	of	ߠ	and	ߩ	given	by:	
	
ߠ ൌ 6.185 െ 29.104 ∗ ߩ	 .	 	 	 	 	 	 													(40)	
	
Importing	the	value	ߩ ൌ 0.015	used	by	Nordhaus,	we	find	that	ߠ ൌ 5.748.	This	implies	a	
much	 lower	 inter‐temporal	elasticity	of	substitution	than	the	parameter	value	of	 	 	ߠ	=	1.5	that	
Nordhaus	 has	 used.	 In	 both	 cases,	 however,	 ߠ ൐ 1.	 The	 latter	 implies	 that	 the	 function	
conventionally	interpreted	as	expressing	an	index	of	utility	or	“felicity,”	namely,	f	=	 1 /(1 )C    ,	
must	be	negative,	but	becoming	less	so	with	increases	in	the	level	of	per	capita	consumption,	so	
that	marginal	 felicity	 remains	positive	and	decreasing	 in	 consumption.	 	 Since	 social	welfare	 is	
the	integral	over	(the	present	value)	of	felicity,	the	corresponding	welfare	index	also	is	negative.	
But	the	scaling	of	these	indexes	is	entirely	arbitrary,	and	it	is	a	permissible	and	simple	operation	
to	 remove	 this	unaccustomed	and	disturbing	negativity	of	 “welfare”	by	 renormalization	of	 the	
index	of	 felicity:	 adding	 to	 it,	 at	 each	moment	 of	 time,	 a	 positive	 term	equal	 to	 the	 (negative)	
value	of	 the	 index	of	 the	original	 index	at	 time	zero.	This	 forces	an	upward	shift	of	 the	 felicity	
function	(and	along	with	it,	the	corresponding	welfare	index)	into	the	positive	quadrant.		
Since	 ߠ	 is	 relatively	 large,	 felicity	 will	 be	 relatively	 small,	 as	 is	 also	 the	 case	 for	 the	
present	 value	 of	welfare.	 The	 numerical	 values	 of	 the	 co‐states	 consequently	will	 be	 small	 as	
well,	 since	 they	 represent	 the	 change	 in	welfare	 due	 to	 a	 1	 unit	 change	 in	 the	 corresponding	
‐ 26 ‐ 
 
states.	 For	 example,	 since	 Y0=68.95	 trillion	 dollars	 of	 2005,43	 our	 assumptions	 imply	 that	
K0=275.8	and	that	C0=(1‐s)Y0=49.16.		Hence,	felicity	at	t=0	is	equal	to	ܨ଴ ൌ ஼బ
భషഇ
ଵିఏ ൌ െ1.958 ∗ 10ିଽ.	
Therefore	 we	 have	 introduced	 a	 multiplicative	 factor	 (equal	 to	 10ଽ	ሻ	to	rescale	 the	 felicity	
function,	which	results	in	values	for	states	and	co‐states	that	are	not	many	orders	of	magnitude	
apart.	








஺ ൌ 0.287.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (41)	
	
With	respect	to	cumulative	CO2	emissions	and	the	location	of	the	climate	tipping	point	in	
terms	 of	 the	 cumulative	 emissions	 generated	 by	 our	 model,	 we	 have	 used	 the	 following	
procedure.	Since	the	atmospheric	concentration	of	carbon	rises	1	ppmv	per	2.1	GTC	(gigaton	of	
carbon)	 remaining	 in	 the	 atmosphere,	 the	 change	 in	 the	 atmospheric	 concentration	 of	 CO2	 is	
given	by:	
	
݌݌݉ ൌ 0.4762 ∗ ܩܶܥ			 ൌ൐ 		∆݌݌݉ ൌ 0.4763 ∗ ∆ܩܶܥ			,		 	 	 	 (42)	
	
where	∆	refers	to	the	first	difference	operator.	The	concentration	level	of	CO2	in	the	atmosphere	












44	 See	 the	 U.S.	 Department	 of	 Commerce	 National	 Oceanic	 &	 Atmospheric	 Administration	 (NOAA)	 data	 (at	
http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/)	for	trends	in		monthly	mean		CO2	concentrations	levels	measured	on	
Mauna	Loa,	Hawaii.	For	the	month	of	October,	the	mean	stood	at	388.92ppmv		in	2011	and	at	391.01	in	2012,	giving	







the	 north	 Pacific.	 	 This	 has	 supported	 the	 consensus	 view	 among	 NOAA’s	 climatologists	 	 and	 their	 international	






The	 equilibrium	 climate	 sensitivity	 parameter	 is	 therefore	 (3.7)(0.8)	 =	 2.96,	 essentially	 a	 gain	 of	 3o	 C.	 Nordhaus	
(2007)	sets	3.0	as	the	magnitude	of	this	parameter,	and	left	 it	unaltered	in	the	2009	recalibration	of	the	DiCE	2007	
model.	 Cai,	 Judd	 and	 Lontzek	 (2012)	 in	 SDICE	 therefore	 incorporated	 that	 point	 estimate	 SDICE,	 the	 annualized	
stochastic	 reformulation	 of	 DICE	 (2007).	 Wikipedia	 currently	 gives	 3.0	 as	 the	 “consensus”	 estimate	 (see	






relative	 to	 preindustrial	 levels	 is	 given	 by	 280	݌݌݉ݒ ∗ ݁ మర.యమవ ൌ 444.4	݌݌݉ݒ.	 For	 a	 3°	 Kelvin	
temperature	rise,	the	corresponding	concentration	of	CO2	would	be	560	ppm.	The	current	rate	





corresponding	 allowed	 “budget”	 of	 net	 carbon	 additions	 to	 the	 atmospheric	 concentration	 	 of		








and	 lower	oceans.	Our	simplification	 is	 indeed	radical,	 for	 it	 specifies	 that	somewhat	 less	 than	
half	of	the	current	gross	emissions	of	carbon	(0.48)	remain	in	the	atmosphere,	thus	constituting		
the	net	flow	of	CO2	that	immediately	is	added	to	the	atmospheric	stock.48		It	thereby	suppressed	
computation	 of	 the	 complicated	 thermal	 oceanic	 lags	 in	 the	 adjustment	 of	 the	 changes	 in	 the	






the	 our	 optimal	 transition	 path	 solution(s)	 through	 a	 complete	 annual	 3‐layer	 model	 of	 the	





DICE	 and	 derivated	 IAMs,	 much	 greater	 uncertainties	 surround	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 	 climate	 sensitivity	 that	 is	
relevant	for	long‐term	changes	in	CO2	concentration	levels.	As	Knutti	and	Hergl	(op.	cit.,	pp.	739‐41)	emphasize,	the	
sensitivity	 is	 state	 dependent	 as	 well	 as	 time	 dependent:	 thus,	 albedo	 will	 be	 lower	 and	 positive	 feedbacks	 from	
radiative	forcings	corresponding	will	be	stronger	in	a	world	with	much	 less	 ice	and	snow low than the present one;  
“slow feedbacks with their own intrinsic timescales, for example changes in vegetation or the retreat of ice sheets and 
their effect on the ocean circulation could increase or decrease sensitivity on long timescales (p.740). 		
47	 See	 the	 NOAA	 (http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/)	 data	 for	 the	 annual	 increases	 in	 the	 CO2	
concentrations	 levels	 measured	 on	 Mauna	 Loa,	 Hawaii.	 Calculated	 for	 the	 years	 2002‐2012	 (from	 the	 time‐series	
available	at		ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_gr_mlo.txt	),		the	average	annual	gain	was	2.06	ppm.	









module	 modestly	 understates	 the	 level	 implied	 by	 using	 a	 3‐layer	 carbon	 cycle	 module	 to	
compute	the	effects	of	the	model’s	flow	of	CO2	emissions:	mid‐way	through	the	transition	phase	
the	proportional	understatement	 is	3.0	percent	of	 the	 lower	 level	of	cumulative	net	emissions,	
whereas	at	the	peak	(when	the	carbon	free	phase	begins)	the	corresponding	understatement	is	
3.5.	 	 The	 associated	 understatement	 of	 the	 rise	 in	 temperature	 is	 more	 marked,	 however,	
especially	 at	 the	 peak,	 and	 if	 one	 considers	 the	 continuous	 function	 for	 unscheduled	 capital	
losses	 (eq.	 41),	 in	which	 the	 second	 derivative	with	 respect	 to	 T	 is	 positive,	 the	 proportional	
understatement	of	the	high	annual	damage	rate	is	very	rapidly	the	transition	phases	second	half		
–	 having	 reaching	 52	 percent	 by	 the	 time	 that	 CO2	 emissions	 are	 stopped.	 Thereafter,	 with		
additions	 to	 the	 cumulative	 net	 stock	 of	 emissions	 having	 dropped	 to	 zero,	 the	 atmospheric	
concerntration	level	computed	from	the	3‐layer	carbon	cycle	model	begin	a	dampen	fluctuating	
decline	towards	much	lower	equilbrium	level.49			




remain	 constant,	 say,	 because	 the	 carbon	 intensity	of	 global	 real	 gross	production	declined	 at	
just	 the	 same	 annual	 pace	 as	 gross	 production	 continued	 to	 grow,	 the	 implication	 is	 that	 a	
“tipping	 point”	 at	 the	 vis‐à‐vis	 the	 pre‐industrial	 temperature	 level	 would	 be	 reached	 during	
2032	 ‐‐	 i.e.,	 2010	 +	 22.4	 years	 (=	 114.2	 GTC/5.10	 GTC	 per	 year).	 Under	 the	 same	 artificial	
conditions,	the	3°	Kelvin	gain	in	temperature	would	be	reached	another	48	years.	
The	CO2	emissions	rate	from	KA:	 	 	
Given	 the	 proportional	 relationship	 between	 CO2	 emissions	 and	 changes	 in	 the		
cumulative	 additions	 to	 the	 atmospheric	 stock	 ܧ	,ሶ 		 under	 the	 assumptions	 of	 our	 simplified	
treatment	 of	 the	 carbon	 cycle	 	 the	 parameter	 ߝ஺	 in	 equation	 (8)	 ‐‐	ܧ	ሶ ൌ ߝ஺ ∙ ܭ஺௎	 ‐‐	 reflects	 the	
emissions	 intensity	 of	 gross	 output,	 the	 average	 (and	marginal	 productivity)	 of	 	 carbon‐using	
production	facilities	and	the	proportion	of		gross	emissions	that	remain	in	atmosphere.	For	the	
magnitude	of	real	gross	global	product	in	2010	we	obtain	the	value	68.95	in	trillions	of	constant	
2005	 dollars	 by	 interpolation	 from	 the	Nordhaus’	 (2010)	 DICE	 calibration	 data	 for	 2005	 and	
2015,	which	sets	the	2010	carbon‐intensity	of	gross	output	at	0.1542	(=10.63/68.95).		Since	the	









rising	 very	 rapidly	 in	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 transition	 phase	 –reaching	 a	 much	 higher	 peak	 by	 the	 time	 that	 CO2	
emissions	are	stopped.	Thereafter,	with		additions	to	the	cumulative	net	stock	of	emissions	having	dropped	to	zero,	
the	 atmospheric	 concerntration	 level	 computed	 from	 the	 3‐layer	 carbon	 cycle	model	 begins	 a	 dampen	 fluctuating	
decline	 towards	much	 lower	equilbrium	 level.	 	Details	of	 these	calculations	are	available	 in	Appendix	B,	on	request	
from	the	authors.			
50	The	high	capital‐output	ratio	specified	here	is	more	than	twice	that	in	the	DICE	(2009)	calibration,	and	justified	on	
the	 following	 considerations:	 firsly,	 the	 Nordhaus	 figure	 appears	 to	 give	 undue	 weight	 to	 the	 fixed	 reproductible	







emissions	 per	 unit	 of	 total,	 carbon‐using	 capital	 (in	 GTC	 per	 trillion	 dollars	 of	 2010)	 at	 	 the	
beginning	of	the		(BAU=)	U	phase	is	found	from:	
	




to	 that	 of	 the	 carbon‐based	 technology.	 In	 addition,	 for	 the	 Basic	 Model	 the	 average	 (and	
marginal)	productivity	of	carbon‐free	capital	is	set	at			ܤ ൌ 0.12.		Further,	in	specifying	the	R&D	





in	 the	 infrastructure	 services	 sector	 (including	 	 the	 energy	 and	 transport	 sectors,	 and	 non‐




an	 arbitrary	 simplification	 of	 the	 continuous	 feedback	 of	 economic	 damage	 from	 the	
accumulating	concentration	of	atmospheric	CO2.	Yet,	the	choice	of	0.0375	for	the	annual	global	
high‐damage	 rate	 of	 losses	 of	 existing	 carbon‐based	 productive	 capacitytaty	 due	 to	 extreme	
weather	 is	 not	 purely	 ad	 hoc.	 	 Its	magnitude	 can	 be	 considered	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 range	 of	
damage	 rates	 implied	 by	 the	 following	 ing	 continuous	 specification	 of	 a	 warming‐driven	
economic	 damage	 function	 in	 which	 our	 proportional	 (weather‐driven)damage	 rate	 (Dw/Y)	
would	be	a	positive	power‐function	of	the	gain	in	global	mean	temparature	()T):		
	




2.32.	 	The	authors’	calibration	proceedure	 involved	fixing	"1	and	"2	 	a	priori,	and	then	 	 finding		
the	value	of	"3		that	gave	the	best	fit	of	the	simulation	output	from	AD‐DICE	to	the	corresponding	
















experiments	 reported	 in	 section	 4	 corresponds	 to	 the	 range	 of	 increased	 CO2	 concentration	
levels	 starting	 in	 2012	 and	 rising	 three‐fold,	 i.e.,	 Et	 =[125,	 375],	 or	 terms	 of	 absolute	
concentrations	 (ppmv)	 levels	 gains	 from	 the	 preindustrial	 level	 of	 (Et+280)	 =	 [396,	 655].		
Therefore,	the	high‐damage	rate	of	unscheduled	losses	of	carbon‐based	production	capacity	that	
is	 specified	 by	 our	 step‐function’s	 jump	 to	 a	 constant	 at	 3.75	 percent	 per	 annum	 rate	
corresponds	to	temperature	that	 is	1.31°	above	 the	2010	 level	 (already	1.5	°	Kelvin	above	 the	








precise	 location	of	 the	 that	 “tipping	point.”	Putting	 the	 stopping	point	 for	 carbon	emissions	at		
324.1ppmv	 over	 the	 pre‐industrial	 concentration	 level	 (280ppmv)	 corresponds	 to	 )T	 =	 3.1°	
Kelvin	(or	Celsius).		In	the	same	spirit,	in	order	to	assure	that	the	expected	higher	rate	of	losses	









Preliminary	 parameter	 sensitivity	 analyses	 performed	 using	 the	 models	 show	 model	
reactions	that	are	familiar	from	growth	theory.	Changes	in	the	rate	of	discount	or	 in	 the	 inter‐
temporal	elasticity	of	substitution	all	have	the	expected	impact.	This	holds	for	the	productivity	
parameters	 as	well.	When	 cumulative	 emission	 thresholds	 are	 tightened,	 the	 shadow	price	 of	
CO2	 emissions	 rises	 (in	 absolute	 terms).	 When	 productivity	 parameters	 increase,	 so	 do	 the	
corresponding	co‐states	of	the	associated	state	variables.		
Rather	 interestingly,	 the	 linking	 of	 various	 sequential	 phases	 results	 in	 anticipatory	
adjustments	that	introduce	transitional	dynamics	which	are	missing	in	an	ordinary	single‐phase	
AK	 endogenous	 growth	 setting.	 The	 results	 obtained	 for	 the	 Basic	 Model	 (BAM)	 with	 the	
parameter	set	and	the	initial	values	described	at	the	end	of	the	preceding	sub‐section	(4.1)	are	
displayed	in	Figures	2.1	and	2.2.	
The	top	row	of	plots	 in	Figure	2.1	displays	 the	outcomes	with	respect	 to	carbon‐based	
capital	KA.	The	vertical	dotted	lines	mark	the	arrival	times	of	the	joint	production	phase	and	the	























phase,	 there	 is	now	 just	one	dotted	vertical	 that	marks	 the	arrival	of	 the	carbon‐free	phase.	 It	
should	be	noted	that	net	investment	in	carbon‐free	capacity	is	rapidly	increasing	during	the	joint	
production	phase	‐‐	in	anticipation	of	the	drop	in	capacity	that	will	occur	at	the	time	of	arrival	of	
the	 carbon‐free	 phase,	 when	 carbon‐based	 capital	 will	 be	 discarded.	 During	 the	 carbon‐free	
phase,	 net	 investment	 in	 the	 carbon‐free	 capital	 stock	 is	 much	 lower	 than	 during	 the	 joint	
production	phase.	
	 In	 the	 third	 row,	 the	 left‐most	 graph	 depicts	 the	 exponential	 rise	 of	 the	 atmospheric	
concentration	 of	 CO2	 (accumulating	 from	 the	 past	 flow	 of	 emissions)	 during	 the	 business‐as‐
usual	 phase.	 These	 continue	 to	 rise	 but	 at	 slowing	 growth	 rates	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 joint	
production	phase,	 eventually	 stabilizing	 at	 the	 threshold	 level	when	 the	economy	has	 entered	
the	carbon‐free	phase	of	production.	The	corresponding	shadow	price	of	cumulative	emissions	






































































the	 “social	 cost	 of	 carbon”	 ‐‐i.e.,	 that	 of	 the	 current	 flow	 of	 CO2	 emissions	 ‐‐	 that	 gradually	
“ramps	up”	pari	passus	with	the	rising	cumulative	stock	of	greenhouse	gas	in	the	atmosphere.53		
The	 explanation	 for	 this	 apparent	 “anomaly”	 is	 simply	 that,	 unlike	 most	 of	 the	 IAM	
studies,	in	our	models	the	effects	of	cumulative	emissions	are	not	represented	as	“damages”	that	
directly	 and	 continuously	 enter	 the	 social	 welfare	 function.	 In	 BAM,	 the	 current	 level	 of	
cumulative	 emissions,	 taken	 in	 combination	 with	 a	 pre‐specified	 level	 of	 the	 climate‐tipping	
point	 (marking	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 climate	 catastrophe	 that	 is	 to	 be	 averted),	 set	 the	 remaining	
permissible	 volume	 of	 cumulative	 CO2	 emissions.	 So	 long	 as	 that	 volume	 is	 positive	 (actual	





time‐derivative	of	 the	corresponding	co‐state	also	equal	 to	zero,	 thereby	 implying	 that	 the	co‐





Figure	2.2	presents	 the	corresponding	BAM	paths	 found	 for	 total	output,	consumption,	
along	with	their	respective	growth	rates,	and	the	indexes	of	“felicity”	(F)	and	social	welfare	(W).	
Note	that	the	rescaling	of	 the	“felicity	 function”	has	yielded	positive	values	for	both	that	 index	





free	 phase:	 when	 the	 remaining	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 is	 discarded,	 aggregate	 capital	
productivity	 suddenly	 drops	 to	 the	 level	 associated	 with	 carbon‐free	 capacity.	 In	 order	 to	
mitigate	the	effects	on	the	consumption	path	of	the	corresponding	drop	in	output,	the	buildup	of	
carbon‐free	capacity	during	the	joint	production	phase	should	be	speeded	up	towards	the	end	of	
the	 production	 phase.	 A	 similar	 pattern	 can	 be	 observed	 (in	 Figure	 2.1)	 for	 the	 buildup	 of	
carbon‐based	 capacity	 during	 the	 business‐as‐usual	 phase,	 as	 an	 increase	 of	 the	 carbon‐using	
                                                            









54	 Since,	 by	 construction,	 the	 threshold	 is	 not	 binding	 during	 the	 BAU	 and	 the	 JPR	 phase,	 the	 emission	 constraint	
hasn’t	 been	 explicitly	 introduced	 in	 the	 Hamiltonians	 pertaining	 to	 both	 phases.	 If	 they	 would	 have	 been,	
complementary	slackness	would	have	‘neutralised’	them	for	the	reasons	given	here.	
55	The	damages,	however,	are	not	modeled	as	losses	of	“environmental	amenities,”	which	would	impinge	directly	upon	
“fecility”	 and	 therefore	 be	 treated	 as	 directly	 damaging	 social	 welfare.	 Instead,	 they	 impinge	 upon	 welfare	 only	






next	 phase.	 This	 nicely	 illustrates	 a	 general	 implication	 of	 technical	 innovations	 that	must	 be	
physically	 embodied	 in	 production	 facilities,	 one	 that	 often	 is	 overlooked	 in	 discussions	 of	











end	of	 its	 range	 ‐‐	 i.e.,	 at	Emax	=125‐130	corresponding	 to	an	atmospheric	CO2	concentration	
level	(405‐410	ppmv)	and	not	far	so	above	the	390	ppmv	mark	reached	by	the	average	record	
reported	 for	 2011‐12	 by	 the	 observatories	 on	 Mauna	 Loa	 (cf.	 below,	 footnote	 44)	 ‐‐	 the	
remaining	 “emissions	 budget”	 is	 so	 small	 that	 there	 are	 less	 than	 10	 years	 left	 to	 accomplish	
whatever	has	to	be	done	before	end	of	the	business‐as‐usual	phase.	Thereafter,	the	duration	of	
the	BAU	phase	increases	almost	linearly	and	less	than	proportionately	in	relation	to	the	further	
relaxation	 of	 the	 constraint	 set	 by	 the	 “permitted	 budget”	 for	 total	 cumulative	 emissions,	 but	
each	“relaxing		
	



























































carbon‐free	 capital	 formation,	 and	 by	 the	 time	 another	 9	 years	 have	 been	 allowed	 for	 the	
(optimized)	 BAU	 duration,	 the	 temperature	 gain	 in	 this	 simple	 illustrative	model	would	 have	
will	have	exceed	the	“dangerous”	2o	C.		
	 Since	 the	 carbon‐free	 end‐phase	has	 a	 constant	 steady	 state	 growth	 rate,	we	 can	 limit	
ourselves	 to	 looking	 only	 75	 years	 into	 the	 future,	 and	 thus	 showing	 just	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	
corresponding	 time	 paths	 following	 the	 successful	 completion	 of	 the	 climate	 stabilizing	
transition.	 	Figures	3.1A	and	3.1.B	show	investment	 for	values	of	 the	emissions	 threshold	 that	
are	 varied	 uniformly	 over	 this	 range.	 	 Low	 threshold	 values	 are	 associated	 with	 the	 low	
frequency	part	 of	 the	 rainbow	color	 spectrum,	 and	higher	 values	of	 the	 threshold	 correspond	
with	correspondingly	higher	color	frequencies,	ending	with	the	violet	part	of	the	color	spectrum	




Figure	3.1.A	ܭ஺ሶ 	:		Emax=125‐375	 	 	 Figure		3.1.B	ܭ஺	:		Emax=125‐375	






















































the	business‐as‐usual	phase	 lengthens	and,	 for	a	given	duration	of	 the	 joint	production	phase,	
that	implies	and	equal‐length	postponement	of	the	arrival	time	of	the	carbon‐free	phase.	But	the	
effect	of	relaxing	that	constraint	is	that	the	phase	of	joint	production	(and	investment	in	carbon‐
free	 capacity)	 also	becomes	 longer.	 	There	 is	 a	 striking	difference,	 however,	 between	 the	way		
that	the	net	investment	patterns	for	carbon‐based	capital	and	for	carbon‐free	capital	are	affected	
by	varying	Emax.	 	As	the	emission	constraint	is	loosened,	the	net	investment	curve	for	carbon‐




rise	 in	 net	 investment	 taking	 place	 over	 a	 longer	 stretch	 of	 time.	 The	 counterpart	 of	 this	
sequence	of	events	is	shown	in	figure	3.1.G	which	shows	the	time	paths	of	consumption.	There	





consequence	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 capital	 is	 a	 produced	 means	 of	 production:	 if	 the	 carbon‐based	
capital	 stock	 is	 limited	 in	 size	 by	 the	 existence	 of	 more	 binding	 cumulative	 CO2	 emission	





Figure	3.1.C	ܭ஻ሶ 	:		Emax=125‐375	 	 	 Figure	3.1.D		ܭ஻	:		Emax=125‐375	
	























	 Obviously,	 more	 limiting	 emissions	 show	 up	 directly	 in	 the	 time	 paths	 of	 cumulative	
emissions,	both	in	terms	of	the	value	of	the	endpoints,	but	also	in	terms	of	the	associated	time	





	 Figure		3.1.F	Output:		Emax=125‐375		 		 Figure	3.1.G	Consumption:	Emax=125‐375	
	
	 That	twist	in	the	relative	levels	of	output,	however,	is	not	mimicked	by	the	time	paths	of	
consumption	 which	 are	 seen	 from	 Figure	 3.1.G	 to	 growth	 in	 parallel.	 Throughout	 the	 entire	
duration	 of	 the	 transition	 it	 is	 the	 less	 tightly	 constrained	 solutions	 that	 yield	 the	 persisting	
higher	 levels	 of	 per	 capita	 consumption.	 	 The	 twist	 in	 the	 relative	 levels	 of	 output,	 just	
mentioned,	is	reflected	by	the	pattern	of	growth	rates	depicted	in	Figure	3.1.H.	The	values	of	the	
growth	rate	of	output	at	 the	end	of	 the	business‐as‐usual	phase	are	the	same	 for	all	 threshold	
values	within	the	range.	However,	the	periods	of	time	during	which	these	growth	rates	affect	the	
level	of	output	are	very	different,	so	much	so	that	the	positive	effect	on	the	level	of	output	(see	

































Figure	3.1.H	Growth	rate		 ሶܻ /ܻ	:		Emax=125‐375	 Figure	3.1.I	Welfare	W	:		Emax=125‐375	
	
The	 effect	 on	 welfare	 of	 less	 stringent	 constraints	 on	 cumulative	 CO2	 emissions	 is	
positive,	as	one	would	expect,	as	can	be	seen	in	Figure	3.1.I.	In	addition,	the	time	paths	become	
closer	together	in	the	vertical	direction	with	the	relaxation	of	that	constraint.	The	implication	of	






	 The	base	 line	results	 for	BAM+R&D	are	presented	 in	Figure	4.1.	The	 length	of	 the	BAU	
phase	and	the	JPR	phase	are	now	27.36	and	13.45	years.	Hence,	the	arrival	date	of	the	carbon‐
free	phase	has	been	ever	 so	 slightly	postponed	 relative	 to	BAM	 (TF=40.81	 for	BAM+R&D	and	
TF=40.17	for	BAM),	but	the	main	difference	is	in	the	relative	lengths	of	the	BAU	and	JPR	phases.	
With	endogenous	R&D,	the	BAU	phase	is	lengthened	from	a	value	of	23.8	to	27.4	years,	whereas	
the	 length	 of	 the	 JPR	 phase	 is	 reduced	 from	 16.4	 in	 BAM	 to	 13.4	 in	 BAM+R&D.	 This	 is	 an	
illustration	of	the	fact	that	accumulation	of	physical	carbon‐free	capital	with	low	productivity	for	
longer	 periods	 of	 time	 (as	 in	 BAM)	 is	 a	 substitute	 for	 the	 accumulation	 of	 high	 productivity	




productivity	 B	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	 technology:	 the	 shadow	 price	 of	 capital	 productivity	 rises	
during	the	business‐as‐usual	phase,	and	then	falls.		
	 	

























the	 capacity	 to	 produce	 carbon‐free	 capital	 that	 will	 embody	 the	 new	 value	 of	 the	 capital	




a	 relatively	 late	 stage	 in	 the	 business‐as‐usual	 phase.	 	 At	 the	 close	 of	 that	 phase	R&D	 activity	
ceases	and	B	remains	at	a	constant	level	(below	its	asymptotic	value)	while	the	shadow	price	of	
B	will	be	falling	from	then	onwards.	

































































































R&D	expenditures	 in	 total	output,	 from	which	 it	 can	be	 seen	 that	 the	exponential	 rise	 in	R&D	
expenditures	at	the	end	of	the	BAU	phase	is	reflected	in	the	slowdown	of	the	growth	rate	of	Y	at	
the	end	of	 the	BAU	phase.	The	 retardation	 in	output	growth	 is	 traceable	 to	 the	slowing	of	net	
investment	in	the	carbon‐based	capital	stock	to	accommodate	the	increase	in	R&D	expenditures.	





cumulative	emission	 threshold	as	was	carried	out	 for	 the	BAM	model.	 Figure	4.3	presents	 the	
initial	 values	 for	 the	 co‐states	 of	 cumulative	 emissions	 (ߣܧܯܷܷܶሻ,	 of	 carbon‐based	 capital	
ሺߣܭܣܷܷܶሻand	of	 the	productivity	 of	 carbon‐free	 capitalሺߣܤܷܷܶሻ,	 as	well	 as	 the	 length	 of	 the	
BAU	phase	(Δܷሻ	and	the	JPR	phaseሺΔܬሻ.	
		The	 plots	 for	 the	 initial	 values	 of	 the	 co‐states	 of	 cumulative	 CO2	 emissions,	 and	 of	
carbon‐based	capital	are	very	similar	to	the	ones	we	had	obtained	 for	BAM,	whereas	 the	plots	
for	 the	 initial	 value	 of	 the	 shadow	 price	 of	 carbon‐free	 capital	 productivity	 show	 that	 tighter	
emission	constraints	tend	to	raise	the	value	of	doing	R&D,	as	one	would	expect.	We	also	find	that	
the	BAU	phase	has	been	lengthened	by	a	couple	of	years,	across	the	board.	One	of	the	reasons	for	



































































































































quite	 different	 from	 those	 in	 BAM	 ‐‐not	 only	 during	 the	 BAU	 phase,	 but	 in	 the	 duration	 of	
following	 joint	 production	phase.	 	 Figure	 5.1	 displays	what	 happens	 to	 the	development	 over	
time	 of	 carbon‐free	 capital	 productivity	 in	 this	 model	 when	 the	 constraint	 imposed	 on	 CO2	
emissions	by	 the	 climate	 catastrophe	 tipping	point	 is	 relaxed.	One	 sees,	 first,	 from	 the	 spread	
between	the	spread	between	the	red	and	the	violet	bounds,	that	an	increasingly	distant	tipping	





during	 the	BAU	phase,	 it	 is	helpful	 to	start	with	a	comparison	of	Figures	4.1.A,	B	with	Figures	









the	effects	of	variations	 in	the	 location	of	the	tipping	point	(TPIRCC	=	Emax),	 it	was	seen	from	
Figures	3.2.A,B	that	in	case	of	BAM	the	more	distantly	positioned	is	the	constraint	on	Emax,	the	
longer	is	the	“stretch‐out”	of	net	investment	in	carbon‐using	capital‐‐deferring	the	largest	annual	
changes	 to	 the	 later	years	of	 the	more	prolonged	BAU	phase.	When	the	option	 to	 improve	 the	
productivity	of	carbon‐free	capital	through	R&D	is	being	exercised,	however,	capital	 formation	
to	 increase	 carbon‐based	 productive	 capacity	 continues	 for	 a	 much	 shorter	 time.	 Other	
comparisons	 reveal	 that	 the	 level	 of	 net	 investment	 in	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 similarly	 is	
lowered	more	in	the	case	of	BAM+R&D	than	it	is	in	the	model	where	the	option	to	invest	in	R&D	
is	not	present.	




of	 net	 investment	 under	 BAM+R&D	 rises	 more	 rapidly	 over	 time	 than	 under	 BAM,	 and	 the	
periods	during	which	the	buildup	of	carbon‐free	capacity	is	realized	are	somewhat	shorter.	
	 	
	 Figure	5.2.A	ܭ஺ሶ 	:		Emax=125‐375	 	 Figure	5.2.B	ܭ஺	:		Emax=125‐375	





















	 	In	 all	 cases,	 however,	 the	 carbon‐free	 capital	 stock	 at	 the	 end	of	 the	 JPR	phase	under	
BAM+R&D	 exceeds	 that	 of	 the	 corresponding	 terminal	 value	 under	 BAM.	 But,	 varying	 the	







	 With	respect	 to	the	time	path	of	emissions,	Figure	5.2.E	exhibits	 the	“shock	absorbing”	
effect	of	exercising	the	R&D	option,	damping	the	impacts	of	the	tighter	constraints	imposed	by	
setting	the	tipping	point	at	lower	CO2	concentration	levels.	From	a	comparison	with	the	results	
for	 BAM	 (in	 Figure	 3.2.E)	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 time‐paths	 of	 cumulative	 emissions	 virtually	











average	 growth	 rate	 slows	 down	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 business‐as‐usual	 phase.	 During	 the	 joint	































production	phase,	however,	 the	 range	of	variation	of	 the	growth	rate	of	output	 is	much	 larger	
under	 BAM+R&D	 than	 under	 BAM,	 while,	 moreover,	 the	 steady	 state	 growth	 rate	 under	












	 The	results	 for	 this	experiment	have	been	obtained	as	 follows.	We	have	 first	made	 the	
assumption	 that	 the	 high	 damage	 depreciation	 parameters	 are	 exactly	 the	 same	 as	 the	 low	
damage	parameters,	 in	which	 case	 the	model	 is	 reduced	 to	 the	BAM+R&D	model,	 providing	 a	
base‐line	 against	 which	 to	 gauge	 the	 effects	 of	 recognizing	 higher	 rates	 of	 warming‐driven	
damages.	 Then	we	 set	 damage	 threshold	well	within	 the	BAU	phase	 of	 the	BAM+R&D	model.	
With	the	onset	threshold	situated	at	87	GTC	net	cumulative	emissions	 from	current	 levels,	 the	






































	 Because	 this	model	 is	 so	 similar	 to	 BAM+R&D,	we	 do	 not	 report	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	
climate	 change	 threshold	 here.	 Rather,	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 experiment	 in	 which	 we	 account	 for	
extra	damages	for	carbon‐based	capital.	The	damage	threshold	effectively	splits	the	BAU	phase	
into	 a	 low	 damage	 first	 sub‐phase	 and	 then	 a	 high	 damage	 sub‐phase.	 The	 joint	 production	
phase	and	the	carbon‐free	phase	now	will	now	also	be	high	damage	phases.	We	can	generate	the	
corresponding	BAM+R&D	model	phase‐durations	by	setting	these	physical	depreciation	rates	at	


































































the	 high	 damage	 sub	 phase.	 Consequently,	 there	 is	 more	 demand	 for	 carbon‐based	 capital	
















lower	volume	of	 carbon‐free	capacity	more	productive	–	 through	greater	 investments	 in	R&D.	
That	is	exactly	what	can	be	observed	from	Figure	5.3:	one	sees	that	that	higher	weather	related	
damages	 tend	 to	 rotate	 the	 time	 path	 of	 carbon‐free	 capital	 productivity	 upwards,	 while	 the	
arrival	of	the	joint	production	phase	is	brought	forward		in	time,	albeit	only	slightly.	
	 A	higher	rate	of	decay	also	makes	the	business‐as‐usual	phase	slightly	shorter,	especially	
because	 the	 low	 damage	 sub‐phase	 decreases	 in	 length.	 The	 latter	 results	 from	 some	 of	 the	
investment	in	carbon‐based	capacity	during	the	high	damage	sub‐phase	being	brought	forward	
in	time,	as	can	be	seen	in	figure	5.6.A.	In	that	Figure,	we	see	that	the	violet	time	paths	are	on	top	
of	 the	 collection	 of	 low	 damage	 sub	 phase	 time	 paths,	 whereas	 during	 the	 high	 damage	 sub	
phase	of	the	BAU	phase,	they	are	at	the	bottom	of	the	collection.56	A	higher	rate	of	carbon‐based	
capital	 accumulation	 in	 the	 low	 damage	 sub‐phase	 ultimately	 implies	 a	 higher	 volume	 of	 the	
























before.	 Hence,	 during	 the	 joint	 production	 phase,	 carbon‐based	 capital	 is	 seen	 to	 depreciate	
considerably	faster	than	in	the	previous	experiments.	The	forward	shift	in	time	of	carbon‐based	
net	 investment	 shows	 up	 as	 a	 distinct	 kink	 in	 the	 high	 decay	 parameter	 time	 paths.	 For	 low	
decay	parameters	values,	 the	BAM+R&D+UCL	results	are	very	close	 to	 the	BAM+R&D	baseline	
results	that	are	identical	to	the	reddest	time	path	in	figure	5.6.B.		
	 The	results	for	net	investment	in	carbon‐free	capacity	exhibit	very	different	behavior	for	
low	 and	 for	 high	 damages.	When	 damages	 are	 low,	 the	 rate	 of	 capital	 accumulation	 is	 rising	
exponentially	 over	 time.	 When	 carbon‐based	 capital	 damages	 are	 high,	 the	 rate	 of	 net	
investment	 in	carbon‐free	capacity	 is	 initially	higher	than	 in	the	 low	damage	phase,	but	at	 the	





Figure	5.6.A	ܭ஺ሶ 	:		ߜ஺ு ൌ 0.0375 െ 0.075		 Figure	5.6.B	ܭ஺	:				ߜ஺ு ൌ 0.0375 െ 0.075	
	
	 	







From	 Figure	 5.6.E	 one	 can	 see	 that	 the	 extra	 net	 investment	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
business‐as‐usual	phase	under	high	weather‐related	damage	conditions	rotates	the	cumulative	











































Figure	5.6.E	Cumulative	emissions	E	:	ߜ஺ு ൌ 0.0375 െ 0.075	
	
	 The	time	paths	for	output	are	provided	in	Figure	5.6.F.	There	is	a	major	disruption	when	
the	 carbon‐free	 phase	 begins,	 but	 this	 doesn't	 really	 affect	 the	 development	 over	 time	 of	 the	
corresponding	 consumption	paths,	 as	we	have	 seen	before,	 and	now	also	 in	Figure	5.6.G.	 The	




Figure	5.6.F.	Output	:	ߜ஺ு ൌ 0.0375 െ 0.075		 						Figure	5.6.G.	Consumption	:	ߜ஺ு ൌ .0375 െ .075	
	
	 Figure	 5.6.H	 shows	 the	 time	 paths	 of	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 output.	 For	 the	 high	 decay	
parameter	paths	the	drop	in	the	growth	rate	of	output	at	the	beginning	of	the	joint	production	







































This	 paper	 presents	 a	 multiphase	 transition	 model	 that	 can	 be	 solved	 to	 obtain	 the	




climate	 system.	 	 That	 transition	 is	 shown	 to	 be	 optimal	 when	 it	 is	 completed	 just‐in‐time,	
because	our	modeling	approach	posits	the	existence	of	a	catastrophic	tipping	point	in	the	Earth’s	
climate	system.	To	have	 failed	 to	stop	short	of	 that	 critical	 threshold,	which	 is	defined	 for	 the	
purpose	 of	 our	 models	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 exogenous	 terminal	 bound	 on	 the	 atmospheric	 CO2	








concentration	 to	 the	 catastrophe	 tipping	 point.	 	 A	 technical	 virtue	 of	 this	 reformulation	 is	 its	
explicit	 acknowledgment	 that	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 coupled	 economic	 and	 geophysical	 systems	
beyond	 the	 tipping	 point	 would	 be	 marked	 by	 the	 high	 frequency	 recurrence	 of	 abrupt	
discontinuities	 in	 temperature	 and	 economic	 and	 demographic	 system‐dynamics.	 Proper	
theoretical	modeling	would	 include	 those	non‐convexities,	 and	 thus	 vitiate	 the	 use	 of	 optimal	
control	analysis.			
	In	 addition	 to	 avoiding	 that	 particular	 cul‐de‐sac,	 this	 paper	 has	 taken	 an	 analytical	
approach	 that	 diverges	 in	 a	 second	way	 from	 the	 one	 that	 has	 come	 to	 characterize	 research	
contributions	in	the	field	of	integrated	assessment	modeling	(IAM)	of	climate	policy.	It	addresses	
the	 problem	 of	 finding	 the	 sequence	 of	 technological	 options	 whose	 development	 and	
deployment	 would	 be	 required	 to	 stabilize	 the	 global	 climate	 in	 the	 finite	 but	 endogenously	
determined	timespan	of	an	optimal	transition	to	an	essentially	carbon‐free	regime	of	production	
that	is	compatible	with	sustainable	economic	development	and	continuing	economic	growth.	



















alternative	 capital‐embodied	 technologies.	 This	 will	 entail	 building	 carbon‐using	 production	
facilities	 that	 are	 sufficient	 to	 allow	 the	 production	 of	 enough	 capital	 of	 the	 kind	 in	 which	
carbon‐free	 technologies	 are	 embodied	 so	 that	 the	 latter	 can	 completely	 displace	 the	
troublesome	CO2‐emitting	production	facilities.		Accordingly,	we	have	opted	for	a	basic	growth	
model	 setting	 that	 features	 two	 distinct	 classes	 of	 technology,	 both	 of	 which	 can	 produce	
malleable	(homogeneous)	output	from	which	either	carbon‐based	or	carbon‐free	capital	goods	
may	be	formed.	Utilizing	the	former	class	of	production	assets,	however,	results	in	the	release	of	
CO2	 emissions	 in	 excess	 of	 the	 natural	 abatement	 capacity	 of	 the	 Earth’s	 forests	 and	 oceans,	
thereby	contributing	to	global	warming.	We	assume,	not	unrealistically,	that	at	the	outset	of	the	
transition	process	the	“dirty”	(carbon‐using)	mode	of	production	characterized	by	a	higher	level	
of	 productivity	 than	 the	 “green”	 alternative:	 its	 technologies	 offer	 average	 unit	 capital	 costs	
lower	than	those	for	production	facilities	that	embody	the	available	carbon‐free	technologies.	
	These	two	(linear)	technology	options	are	introduced	into	the	otherwise	simple	setting	
of	 the	 AK	 endogenous	 growth	 model	 by	 Rebelo	 (1991),	 but	 complicating	 the	 latter	 by	 the	





the	 global	 production	 regime’s	 overall	 carbon‐intensity	 more	 rapidly	 the	 more	 closely	 the	
average	 productivity	 of	 carbon‐free	 facilities	 came	 to	 approach	 (and	 surpass)	 that	 of	 carbon‐
based	capital	stock.	
	The	 “embodiment”	 assumption	 and	 its	 implications	 are	 especially	 appropriate	 in	 our	
view,	 and	 perhaps	 more	 importantly	 that	 expressed	 by	 engineers	 with	 experience‐based	
expertise	with	 innovation	processes	 in	 energy	 supply	 systems.	 Yet,	 our	 explicit	 recognition	 of	
this	constitutes	an	important	departure	of	the	present	analysis	(and	its	account	of	the	dynamics	
of	 the	 optimal	 climate‐stabilizing	 transition	 path)	 from	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 effects	 of	
endogenous	 technological	 change	 have	 been	 treated	 in	 previous	 economic	 contributions	 to	
integrated	 modelling	 of	 climate	 policy	 measures	 –	 where	 assuming	 that	 technical	 change	 is	
disembodied	has	long	remained.		
Focusing	on	sequencing	the	deployment	of	different	categories	of	technology	policy,	our	
imposition	 of	 minimally	 restrictive	 efficiency	 conditions	 leads	 to	 a	 multi‐phase	 optimization	
framework	in	which	the	Basic	Model	of	technology	switching	recognizes	three	separate	phases	
of	 production,	 each	 of	 them	 characterized	 by	 different	 technologies	 or	 combinations	 of	
technologies	being	active.	 It	 is	shown	that	due	to	the	 linear	production	technologies	employed	
there	will	always	be	an	active	tangible	capital	formation	process	to	implement	one	or	the	other	
of	 these	 technologies	 ‐‐	 even	 though	 output	 can	 be	 produced	 using	 both	 technologies	
concurrently	 as	 long	 as	 there	 is	 still	 room	 to	 emit	 CO2	 from	 the	 facilities	 that	 use	 energy	
obtained	by	burning	fossil	fuels.			The	first	of	the	three	phases	is	called	the	‘Business‐as‐usual’	or	
BAU	phase,	 in	which	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 is	 still	 being	 built	 up,	 and	 the	output	 produced	 is	
completely	carbon‐based.	At	some	point	in	time	the	next	phase	arrives,	in	which	investment	in	
carbon‐based	capital	ceases	and	the	buildup	and	concurrent	use	of	carbon‐free	capacity	begins.	
During	 that	 phase,	 production	 using	 carbon‐based	 capital	 continues	 but	 the	 production	 level	





the	 remaining	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 is	 scrapped	 and	 production	 is	 from	 then	 on	 completely	
carbon‐free:	the	green	future	has	arrived	(just‐in‐time).	
We	 extend	 the	 basic	 three‐phase	 BAM	 setting	 in	 two	 ways.	 First	 we	 introduce	
endogenous	 R&D	 driven	 technical	 change	 that	 improves	 the	 productivity	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	






R&D	driven	technical	change	stops	the	moment	 the	new	technology	starts	 to	be	 implemented.	
	 The	build‐up	of	carbon‐free	capacity	to	a	level	that	is	sufficient	to	mitigate	the	aggregate	
productivity	 drop	 associated	 with	 the	 scrapping	 of	 remaining	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 at	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	 phase	 will	 take	 time.	 That	 fact	 is	 one	 of	 the	 main	 reasons	 for	
focusing	 attention	 on	 the	 optimum	 timing	 of	 the	 changes	 between	 the	different	 phases	 of	 the	
model.	 The	 specification	of	 the	way	R&D	alters	 the	productivity	 of	 capital	 embodying	 carbon‐
free	technologies,	when	incorporated	in	an	AK‐setting	with	a	limiting	constant	marginal	product	
of	 capital,	 generates	 productivity	 levels	 for	 the	 class	 of	 “alternative”	 technologies	 that	 are	
bounded	 from	 above	 (asymptotic	 technical	 change)	 ‐‐	 reflecting	 the	 ‘fishing‐out’	 effect	
recognized	 in	much	 of	 the	 endogenous	 growth	 literature	 since	 Jones	 (1995).	 The	 latter	 effect	
seems	especially	relevant	in	regard	to	the	further	development	of	a	specific	class	of	technologies,	




damage	 threshold.	 For	 this	 purpose	 we	 proceed	 simply,	 by	making	 the	 assumption	 that	 high	
rates	of	loss	of	productive	capacity	due	to	expected,	but	unscheduled	rates	of	loss	in	productive	
capacity	 will	 occur	 after	 the	 system	 reaches	 an	 “extreme	 weather	 tipping	 point”	 (defined	 in	
terms	of	mean	global	temperature,	or,	equivalently,	a	CO2	concentration	level).	The	latter	is	set	




transversality	 conditions	 following	 from	 the	 optimality	 condition	 that	 the	 values	 of	 the	
Hamiltonians	must	be	 identical	when	evaluated	at	 the	moment	of	 the	phase	change	under	 the	
conditions	pertaining	to	the	phases	just	before	and	just	after	the	passage	between	phases.		In	the	
Basic	 Model	 (without	 R&D	 and	 extra	 weather	 related	 damages)	 the	 condition	 defining	 the	
optimum	 length	 of	 the	 BAU	phase	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 shadow	prices	 of	
carbon‐based	 and	 carbon‐free	 capacity	 should	 be	 the	 same	 at	 the	moment	 investment	 in	 the	
latter	technology	takes	over	from	investment	in	the	former.	This	makes	perfect	economic	sense,	
as	the	opportunity	cost	of	a	unit	of	investment	in	terms	of	consumption	foregone	is	the	same	in	
both	 cases.	 For	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 change	 from	 the	 J‐phase	 to	 the	 F‐	 phase,	 the	 optimality	





utility	 value	 of	 the	 corresponding	 emissions).57	 For	 the	 other	 versions	 of	 the	 model,	 more	






at	 the	moment	of	a	phase	 change,	 the	 transversality	 conditions	 in	 combination	with	 the	given	
initial	 and	 terminal	 values	 for	 the	 state	 variables	 in	 the	 model	 allow	 us	 to	 use	 a	 (steepest	
descent)	search	method	that,	for	a	priori	“guesses”	of	the	still	missing	initial	values	of	a	subset	of	









regarding	 the	capital	productivity	parameters	and	 the	parameters	of	 the	R&D	 function.	 	Using	








capacity.	 	 In	 the	simulations	where	the	catastrophic	climate	“tipping	point”	was	systematically	
varied	to	show	the	implications	of	more	stringently	applying	the	precautionary	principle	in	the	
BAM	setting,	it	was	that	that	a	faster	pace	of	accumulation	of		carbon‐based	capital	was	optimal	
when	 the	 “tipping	 point”	 in	 cumulative	 CO2	 emissions	 was	 lower,	 so	 that	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	
carbon‐free	 phase	 could	 be	 brought	 forward	 in	 time.	 To	 facilitate	 this	 adjustment,	 a	 quicker	
buildup	of	the	carbon‐based	capital	stock	was	required	to	enable	switching	at	an	earlier	point	to		
carbon‐free	 capital	 formation	 and	 production,	 thereby	 permitting	 higher	 rates	 of	 both	
investment	 and	 consumption	 when	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 was	 being	 allowed	 to	 depreciate	




stock	 is	 derived	 in	 large	 part	 from	 the	 value	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	 capital	 stock	 that	 it	 is	 able	 to	
produce.	
                                                            
57	 This	 equality	 closely	 resembles	 the	 ‘negative	 quasi‐rent’	 scrapping	 condition	 that	 is	 familiar	 in	 the	 theoretical	






When	 account	 is	 taken	 within	 this	 framework	 of	 the	 greater	 expected	 frequency	 of	
warming‐driven	 “extreme	 weather”	 damages	 to	 the	 flow	 of	 real	 output	 from	 vulnerable	
productive	 capacity,	 such	 that	 the	 rate	 of	 unscheduled	 losses	 of	 KA	 is	 irreversibly	 shifted	
upwards	at	some	point	during	the		U‐phase,	an	extra	phase	is	added	to	the	Basic	Model’s	three	
phases.		The	resulting	extended	version	of	the	Basic	model	has	a	low	damage	sub‐phase	that	the	
calibration	 assures	 begins	 before	 the	 J‐phase,	 and	 a	 high	 damage	 sub‐phase	 that	 extends	
throughout	the	J‐phase	and	affects	the	remaining	carbon‐based	capital	stock.59		The	expectation	
of	 extra	 weather‐related	 damages,	 in	 effect,	 resembles	 an	 anticipated	 accelerated	 rate	 of	
depreciation,	creating	a	wedge	in	the	rate	of	return	on	carbon‐based	investment	throughout	the	
low	 damage	 portion	 of	 the	 U‐phase.	 Consistent	 with	 this,	 it	 is	 found	 that	 there	 is	 extra	
investment	in	carbon‐based	capacity,	especially	during	the	later	portion	of	the	low	damage	sub‐
phase	 portion	 within	 the	 U‐phase.	 	 An	 increase	 in	 the	 annual	 proportionate	 toll	 taken	 of	
productive	 capacity	 by	 extreme	 weather	 damages	 also	 leads	 to	 a	 more	 even	 distribution	 of	
carbon‐free	 investment	 over	 time,	 as	 that	mitigates	 the	 negative	 impact	 on	 consumption,	 and	
hence	 on	 social	 welfare.	 	 During	 the	 initial	 sub‐phase	 when	 the	 damage	 rate	 remains	 low,	
investments	 in	 carbon‐based	 capacity	 are	 increasing,	 in	 anticipation	 of	 the	 need	 during	 the	
ensuing	J‐phase	(of	joint	production)	to	build	up	carbon‐free	capacity	quickly	in	order	to	cushion	
consumption	 as	much	 as	 is	 possible	 against	 the	 forced	 drop	 in	 aggregate	 output	 that	 will	 be	







	 When	 the	 basic	 model	 was	 extended	 to	 allow	 for	 endogenous	 adjustments	 of	 R&D	
expenditures,	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 U‐phase	 increased	 relative	 to	 that	 observed	 in	 the	 BAM	
solution.	 This	 result	 is	 evident	 from	 the	 comparison	 of	 the	 optimized	 phase	 durations	
summarized	by	the	comparative	tableau	that	is	presented	below.		Consequently,	R&D	activity	is	















exploit	existing	engineering	designs	lower	costs	of	servicing	existing	directly	productive	capacity.	 	While	KB	 	 ,	being	
newly	formed,	could	be	sited	so	as	to	be	less	vulnerable	to	the	weather	variations	in	the	altered	climate	conditions,	
uncertainties	 combined	with	 greater	 costs	 could	 combine	with	 increasing	 severity	 of	 storms	 and	 flooding	 (at	 still	
further	 elevated	 mean	 global	 temperature)	 not	 only	 throughout	 the	 JPR	 and	 CFR	 phases.	 A	 later	 specification,	





based	 upon	 fossil‐fueled	 capital.	 The	 overall	 effect	 is	 that	 the	 carbon‐free	 (F)	 phase	 comes	
slightly	earlier	than	in	BAM,	while	the	dispersion	in	the	welfare	effects	is	less	than	under	BAM.	





The	entries	 in	 the	 tableau’s	bottom	row	gives	greater	salience	 to	one	of	 the	broad	and	
important	 insights	gained	by	the	key	departure	of	our	modeling	approach	 from	the	traditional	
one	that	characterizes	the	IAMs	research	literature.		As	a	first	step	towards	the	design	of	a	‘tech‐
fix’	 climate	 stabilization	 policy,	 we	 have	 reformulated	 the	 problem	 as	 one	 of	 identifying	 the	
technological	measures	and	macro‐economic	 resource	 reallocations	 that	would	be	 required	 in	
order	 to	spend	the	entire	 “allowable	budget”	of	GHG	emissions	(in	CO2‐equivalent	ppmv)	on	a	
transition	 to	 a	 carbon	 free	global	production	 regime	 that	must	 satisfy	 two	 fundamental	meta‐
level	constraints.		Firstly,	it	is	necessary	to	complete	that	transition	in	time	to	avert	the	onset	of	
catastrophic	 “runaway”	 global	 warming	 and	 there	 by	 permit	 the	 subsequent	 attainment	 of	
sustainable	 development	 and	 economic	 growth.	 	 Secondly,	 subject	 to	 the	 first	 necessity,	 the	
required	 intangible	 (R&D)	 investment	 and	 tangible	 capital	 formation	 during	 that	 transition	
should	be	welfare	optimal	in	their	sequencing,	magnitudes	and	timing	‐‐	which	is	to	say	they	will	
be	subject	to	the	assumed	form	of	the	social	welfare	function,	 its	parametric	specifications	and	
the	 social	 rate	 of	 time	 discounting	 during	 each	 of	 the	 several	 phases,	 and	 satisfy	 the	
transversality	conditions	that	tie	the	phases	together	to	form	an	optimal	path.		
			Although	 the	 models	 vary	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 attributes	 of	 the	 technologies,	 and	 the	
consequent	climate	feedbacks,	the	total	duration	of	the	first	two	phases	of	the	optimal	transition	
is	essentially	 the	same	in	all	 three	models	because	 the	optimization	 in	effect	 is	utilizing	better	
technologies	created	by	R&D	expenditures	to	spend	the	allowable	budget	of	carbon	emissions	in	
a	 welfare‐enhancing	 way;	 	 similarly,	 the	 social	 planner	 adjusts	 the	 allocation	 of	 resources	 to	
minimize	the	adverse	welfare	effects	of	future	climate	feedbacks	driven	by	warming.	This,	as	has	
been	 seen,	 left	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 initial	 transition	 phase	 unaltered,	 while	 only	 slightly	
shortening	 the	 joint	 production	 phase	 throughout	 which	 a	 higher	 annual	 rate	 of	 extreme	
weather	events	caused	losses	of	available	carbon‐based	capacity.		
The	 close	 consilience	 of	 the	 length	 of	 the	 completed	 transitions,	 which	 cluster	 tightly	
around	 the	 40‐year	 mark	 despite	 the	 underlying	 shifts	 in	 BAU	 and	 JPR	 phases,	 provides	 a	
striking	degree	of	 “concrete‐ness”	 to	 the	point	 that	has	been	made	qualitatively	 in	 Section	4’s	
discussion	of	the	effect	of	exploiting	the	R&D	investment	option.		Comparing	the	results	for	BAM	
with	those	for	BAM+R&D	in	order	to	gauge	the	effect	of	exercising	the	R&D	investment	option,	
the	 right‐most	 column	 in	 the	 tableau	 shows	 the	 offsetting	movements	 of	 the	 two	 component	




free	 capital	 stock	 works	 in	 the	 same	 direction	 during	 the	 extra	 4.4	 years	 of	 the	 U	 phase	 –	
promoting	the	build‐up	more,	 less	costly	carbon‐using	production	capacity.	 	One	should	notice	
also	 that	 although	 anticipated	 capacity	 losses	 from	 in	 the	 “high	 damage”	 sub‐phase	 of	 (BA)	U	
tends	to	reduce	the	subsequent	annual	flows	of	output	and	emissions,	that	effect	is	offset		by	the	




	 It	 is	worth	emphasizing	 the	point	 that	 in	 the	 framework	of	 this	 transition	analysis	 the	
welfare‐enhancing	 effect	 of	 conducting	 R&D	 to	 lower	 the	 unit	 capital	 costs	 of	 alternatives	 to	
fossil	fueled	technologies	‐‐	and,	more	generally	of	optimally	deploying	still	other	CO2	mitigating	
techniques			‐‐	is	the	dual	of	the	essential	constancy	in	the	endogenously	determined	duration	of	
the	 transition	 to	 a	 stabilized	 climate.	 That	 result,	 however,	 is	 not	 an	 artifact	 of	 any	 particular	
features	in	the	specifications,	or	in	the	calibrations	of	the	models	–	for	none	were	selected	with	a	
view	 to	 yielding	 this	 common	 property	 of	 the	 solutions	 exhibited	 in	 the	 foregoing	 tableau.		
Instead,	the	clustering	of	the	combined	durations	of	the	first	two	phases	(i.e.,	the	“transitions”)	in	
these	models	 has	 a	 very	 different	 and	 quite	 generic	 cause,	 one	 that	 can	 be	 stated	 simply	 and	
grasped	intuitively	from	the	following	considerations.		
	 Each	model	 starts	 from	 the	 same	 implicit	 level	 of	 atmospheric	 CO2	 concentration	 and	
has	 the	 identical	 “budget”	 for	permissible	 further	cumulative	emissions.	That	 follows	 from	the	
requirement	 that	 in	 each	 case	 the	 transition	 to	 a	 carbon‐free	 production	 regime	 must	 be	
completed	before	the	arriving	at	the	hypothesized	“tipping	point”	–	set	at	a	3°	Kelvin	rise	above	
the	pre‐industrial	epoch’s	mean	global	temperature	level.	The	uniformity	of	the	resulting	“hard	
carbon	 budget	 constraint”	 (in	 terms	 of	 the	 volume	 of	 net	 emissions	 generated	 during	 the	
transition)	 is	 a	 property	 of	 the	 common	 climate	 system.	 It	 is	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 establish	
comparability	 among	 the	 optimized	 solutions	 for	models	 that	 consider	 different	 technological	
options	and	climate	feedbacks	affecting	the	macro‐economy.	In	other	words,	imposing	a	uniform	
hard	 budget	 constraint	 is	 a	 generic	 condition	 for	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 integrated	 climate	
stabilization	models	that	specify	any	selected	pair	of	[start,	stop]	CO2	concentration	levels.		
			 Consequently,	 the	 intuitive	 way	 understanding	 what	 is	 going	 on	 in	 these	 DIRAM	
transition	 path‐optimization	 problems	 is	 that	 the	 “social	 planner”	 is	 maximizing	 the	 global	
present	value	of	 social	welfare	 from	consumption	utility	 (‘felicity’)	by	 taking	whatever	actions	
are	required	to	spend	her	“allowed	carbon	emissions	budget”	efficiently	by	exploiting	whatever	
technological	means	already	exist	or	 can	be	made	available	 for	 the	purpose.	 	Furthermore,	on	
grounds	of	efficiency	she	always	will	contrive	to	have	completely	exhausted	the	fixed	emissions	
budget	just	before	the	economy	enters	the	phase	of	zero	(net)	emissions.	Given	the	anticipated	
constraints	 imposed	 upon	 optimization	 by	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 climate	 system,	 better	
technological	 tools	 therefore	 will	 be	 translated	 into	 the	 highest	 attainable	 (which	 is	 to	 say,	
“constrained”)	level	of	social	welfare.		Of	course,	the	social	planner,	having	come	onto	the	scene	
after	 global	warming	has	 been	 underway	 for	 some	 long	 time,	 cannot	 escape	 realities	 that	 are	
                                                            












expose	 and	 illuminate	 the	 complex	 nature	 of	 the	 dynamic	 interrelationships	 entailed	 in	 those	
catastrophe‐averting	 actions,	 rather	 than	 to	 predict	 the	 required	 duration	 of	 the	 completed	
transition,	 or	 of	 its	 constituent	 sub‐phases.	 Therefore,	 no	 particular	 significance	 should	 be	
attached	to	the	40‐year	duration	‐‐	around	which	the	optimized	transitions	in	the	present	group	
of	models	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 tightly	 clustered.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 calibration	 of	 these	
models	 (above,	 sect.	 3.1)	 points	 out	 that	 the	 combined	 effect	 of	 modeling	 simplifications	
imposed	 for	 computational	 reasons	 tends,	 on	 balance,	 to	 create	 a	 more	 optimistic	 outlook	
regarding	the	time‐duration	that	is	available	for	an	optimal	transition	to	a	stable	global	climate,	
and	correspondingly	suggests	that	the	process	would	exact	a	less	heavy	toll	in	terms	of	reduced	




regard,	 we	 have	 been	 surprised	 (and	 could	 not	 help	 but	 be	 a	 little	 ‘tickled’)	 by	 the	 specific	
numerical	result	that	has	emerged	from	this	exploratory	application	of	the	DIRAM	approach	‐‐	
viz.,	 that	 the	 “required”	 transition	 period	 on	which	 the	 computed	 solutions	 concur	 lasts	 four	
decades	from	the	t=0	point,	which	our	calibrations	set	to	correspond	with	2010.		That	outcome	
happens	 to	 be	 perfectly	 aligned	 with	 the	 conclusions	 of	 recent	 comprehensive	 studies	 of	 the	
feasibility	 and	 extent	 of	 the	 technological	 and	 physical	 transformation	 in	 modern	 energy	
systems	such	as	that	of	the	U.S.	economy.		Based	upon	detailed	technical	engineering	design	and	
implementation	 considerations	 that	 are	 essentially	 orthogonal	 to	 the	models	 developed	 here,	
the	current	consensus	of	expert	 judgments	 is	 focused	on	the	decades	2010‐2050	as	the	period	
during	 which	 a	 concerted	 technological	 effort	 could	 manage	 to	 end	 the	 contribution	 of	











62	 To	 review	 those	 points	 briefly,	 recall	 that:	 (1)	 the	 catastrophe	 tipping	 point	 was	 set	 at	 the	 upper	 end	 of	 the	
temperature	 gain	 range	 that	 presently	 is	 regarded	 to	 be	 “safe”,	 (2)	 the	 radically	 simplified	 representation	 of	 the	
carbon	understates	 the	 rise	 in	 the	 atmospheric	 concentration	 levels	during	 the	 latter	half	 the	 the	 transition,	 and	a	
















reinforcing	 comfort	 about	 both	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 climate	 change	 challenge	 and	 this	 particular	
research	 exercise	 –	 if	 only	we	 did	 not	 have	 grounds	 for	 believing	 that	 the	 specifications	 and	
calibrations	employed	here	are	likely	to	err	in	painting	too	rosy	a	picture.	





the	co‐state	of	E(t)	 ‐‐	which	 is	 to	 say	 the	 (negative)	marginal	 values	of	 current	period	 flow	of	
emissions	that	will	add	to	the	atmospheric	concentration	of	CO2	–	appears	as	a	horizontal	 line	
throughout	the	transition	in	the	case	of	BAM,	or	the	low‐damage	and	high‐damage	sub‐phases	of	
the	 transition	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 BAM+R&D+UCL)	 until	 its	 completion	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
carbon‐free	phase	of	economic	growth.		Applying	the	label	“social	cost	of	carbon”	is	an	entirely	
valid	 way	 to	 interpret	 the	 economic	 welfare	 significance	 of	 that	 “shadow	 price”	 (marginal	











marginal	 values	 of	 current	 period	 flow	 of	 emissions	 that	 will	 add	 to	 the	 atmospheric	
concentration	 of	 CO2	 –	 appears	 as	 a	 horizontal	 line	 throughout	 the	 transition,	 up	 until	 its	
completion	and	the	beginning	of	the	carbon‐free	phase	of	economic	growth.		Applying	the	label	
“social	cost	of	carbon”	is	an	entirely	valid	way	to	interpret	the	economic	welfare	significance	of	
that	 “shadow	 price”	 (marginal	 valuation)	 of	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 currently	 stock	 of	
atmospheric	 CO2	 and	 its	 	 pre‐industrial	 level	 ‐‐that	 being	 the	 way	 the	 state	 variable	 E(t)	 is	
defined.	But	it	would	be	entirely	inappropriate	to	casually	take	the	further	interpretive	step	and	




and	 RICE	 models	 applied	 developed	 by	 Nordhaus	 (e.g.,	 1994,	 2000,	 2007,	 2010),	 and	 other	
integrated	 assessment	 studies	 that	 have	 drawn	 directly	 and	 indirectly	 on	 those	 pioneering	
research	 contributions.	 But	 it	 doesn’t	 follow	 in	 the	 present	 context	 for	 a	 simple	 reason:	 the	
DIRAM	structure	differs	radically	from	that	class	of	IAM	structures,	most	obviously	in	not	having	
considered	 the	optimal	design	of	 climate	policy	 instruments	 such	 as	 scheduled	 taxes	on	 fossil	










the	 following	 fact:	 throughout	 the	 period	 during	 which	 the	 cumulative	 stock	 of	 CO2	 (by	
construction)	has	been	kept	from	reaching	the	(pre‐specified)	tipping	point	into	“climate‐system	
catastrophe,”	the	marginal	social	costs	of	CO2	emissions	at	each	moment	are	measured	in	terms	
of	 the	 unchanging	 value	 of	 the	 “felicity”	 foregone	 by	 having	 to	 divert	 enough	 output	 from	
consumption	to	other	(investment)	activities	that	will	avert	adding	the	marginal	unit	of	carbon	
to	the	existing	atmospheric	concentration	of	greenhouse	gases.	 	Consequently,	were	the	simple	
step‐function	 specification	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 rising	 atmospheric	 concentrations	 of	 CO2	 and	
increased	warming	 to	 be	 replaced	 by	 continuous,	 progressively	more	 steeply	 rising	weather‐




options	 certainly	 should	move	 towards	 building	models	 in	which	 carbon‐pricing	mechanisms	
are	 available	 for	 use	 as	 policy	 instruments,	 and	 apply	 such	 modes	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 “mixed	
control	systems”	that	use	those	tools,	along	with	a	variety	of	other	means	by	public	policy	and	
private	 non‐profit	 initiatives	 that	 would	 contribute	 to	 speeding	 costly	 transformations	 of	 the	
global	regime	of	production	in	the	world’s	“mixed	economies.”			
	 That	task	would	seem	to	open	a	temptingly	large	and	policy	relevant	field	for	systematic	
explorations	using	multiphase	optimal	control	 techniques.	Yet,	 at	present	 it	appears	 to	be	one	
that	may	be	 tackled	more	productively	once	 the	 frontier	 of	DIRAM	research	has	 advanced	 far	






about	 the	optimal	 transition	dynamics	displayed	by	 these	very	 simple	models	of	 a	global	eco‐
climate	 system?	 	 First,	 one	 must	 stress	 the	 general	 point	 that	 the	 embodiment	 of	 technical	
change	in	physical	units	of	capital	underlines	the	practical	importance	of	the	notion	of	capital	as	
a	produced	means	of	production.	Recognition	of	this	highlights	the	need	to	build	or	maintain	a	
carbon‐based	 capital	 production	 system	 that	 is	 adequate	 to	 produce	 the	 right	 amount	 and	
quality	 of	 the	 carbon‐free	 production	 units	 on	 which	 future	 welfare	 will	 exclusively	 come	 to	
depend;	 and	 to	 do	 so	 within	 the	 remaining	 time‐span	 allowed	 by	 the	 accumulating	 stock	 of	
atmospheric	 CO2.	 	 	 The	 results	 thus	 draw	 attention	 that	 has	 remained	 largely	 ignored	 by	 the	
AIMs	research	literature,	whose	economic	growth	modeling	assumes	that	technical	changes	do	













certain	 assumptions	 that	 were	 made	 for	 computational	 purposes	 in	 calibrating	 the	 models	
developed	here.				
Secondly,	 R&D	 emerges	 from	 this	 analysis	 as	 an	 important	 means	 of	 cushioning	 the	
negative	welfare	effects	of	tighter	emission	thresholds	and	increasing	weather	related	damages.	
The	reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	physical	capital	 investment	 in	carbon‐based	capacity	 is	at	 the	same	
time	both	a	substitute	 for	and	a	complement	of	R&D	investment.	 It	 is	a	substitute	 from	a	pure	
production	point	of	view,	while	it	is	a	complement	because	of	the	embodied	nature	of	technical	
change	 that	 needs	 physical	 investment	 to	 turn	 potential	 productivity	 improvements	 into	 real	




increase	 future	 carbon‐free	 output	 levels	 and	 growth	 rates	 in	 the	 face	 of	 increasingly	 volatile	
weather	events	and	corresponding	damages	and	a	rising	probability	of	runaway	global	warming.	
		Thirdly,	 the	 idealized	 “optimal	 planning”	 framework	 for	 endogenous	macroeconomic	
growth	 seen	 to	be	well	 suited	 to	 incorporating	 representations	of	 the	 technical	 aspects	of	 the	
array	of	existing	and	potential	technological	options	and	their	respective	resource	requirements,	
as	well	 as	 those	 required	 to	operationalizing	 a	welfare‐optimal	 transition	path.	Application	 of	
multi‐phase	optimal	control	analysis	provides	DIRAM	solutions	that	describe	the	optimal	flows	
of	tangible	and	intangible	capital	formation,	along	with	the	production	flows	using	carbon‐based	
or	 alternative	 technologies	 in	 each	 of	 the	 phases,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 sequencing	 and	 respective	
durations	of	the	latter	which	completely	describe	the	completed	transition	path.	
This	 very	 concrete	way	 of	 setting	 out	what	 has	 to	 be	 accomplished	 technologically	 in	
each	of	 the	phases,	 in	 our	 view,	 can	provide	a	useful	 starting	point	 for	 thinking	 about	how	 to	
design	and	coordinate	the	multiplicity	of	diverse	tasks	that	will	need	to	be	undertaken	in	order	
to	 adequately	 respond	 to	 the	 daunting	 existential	 challenges	 posed	 by	 global	 warming	 and	
climate	 instability.	 More	 intricate	 and	 computationally	 demanding	 modeling	 and	 analyses	 of	
temporally	extended	multi‐phase	transition	paths	surely	will	be	necessary	to	shed	greater	light	





	(i)	 harvesting	 “low‐hanging	 fruit”	 ‐‐	 by	 investments	 that	 implement	 core	 engineering	
know‐how	 to	 incrementally	 retrofit	 existing	 carbon‐burning	 infrastructure	 and	 direct	
productive	 capital	 goods,	 allowing	 these	 to	 switch	 to	 the	 “less	 dirty”	 fossil	 fuels	 as	 energy	
sources	 (e.g.,	natural	gas,	 in	place	of	oil	 for	heating	and	(diesel)	 internal	 combustion	engines),	
and/or	upgrade	 the	energy	efficiency	of	existing	buildings	and	production	equipment,	and	 the	
same	might	well	be	said	for	curtailing	releases	of	methane	and	other	potent	GHGs;		





parallel	 on	 the	 development	 and	 field‐testing	 of	 safely	 scalable	 “back‐stop”	 technologies	 for	
‐ 59 ‐ 
 
atmospheric	 carbon	 capture	 and	 sequestration	 (ACCS),	 and	 locally	 deployable	 solar	 radiation	
management	(SRM)	techniques.65		
(iv)	 Capital	 formation	 for	 reforestation	 with	 fast‐growing	 leafy	 trees	 in	 order	 to	
efficiently	raise	the	natural	capacity	CO2	abatement	capacity	of	the	Earth’s	present	forest	cover	
as	 far	 as	 possible.	 Although	 it	 is	 highly	 unlikely	 that	 this	 measure	 could	 compensate	 for	 the	
degraded	 abatement	 capacity	 of	 the	 oceans	 that	 would	 result	 from	 continuing	 warming,	
pursuing	this	option	should	be	seen	not	as	“a	fix”	but	as	a	“buy	time”	strategy	(similar	to	item	(i)	
above)	 in	 its	 effects	 on	 the	 net	 volume	 of	 CO2	 that	 is	 added	 to	 the	 atmosphere	 by	 burning	
carbon.	Policy	measures	aimed	at	slowing	or	actually	halting	the	clear‐cutting	of	 forests	would	
work	 in	 the	 same	 direction,	 and	 might	 also	 involve	 compensatory	 capital	 formation	 to	 raise	
agricultural	yields	and	the	livestock	carrying	capacity	of	already	cleared	lands,	thereby	tending	
to	reduce	the	economic	pressures	that	are	driving	deforestation	due	to	human	agency.		
	(v)	 “Defensive”	 expenditures	 for	 engineering	design	 research	and	 capital	 formation	 to	
implement	physical	 reinforcements	and	additions	 to	existing	 infrastructure	 that	would	 reduce	
the	 latter’s	 own	 vulnerability	 to	 damage	 caused	 by	 extreme	 weather	 events	 and	 extensive	
flooding.	This	would	serve	to	mitigate	direct	and	indirect	losses	of	productive	capacity	as	well	as	
providing	 a	measure	of	 protection	 from	 loss	of	 lives	and	 livelihoods	 in	 some	 forms	of	natural	
disasters	that	are	likely	to	become	more	destructive	due	to	regional	climate	changes.		
Quite	 obviously,	 it	 will	 be	 no	 mean	 task	 for	 future	 research	 to	 develop	 informative	
heuristic	 representations	 of	 the	 foregoing	 dynamic	 processes,	 and	 to	 explore	 the	 way(s)	 to	
sequence	 the	exercise	of	 the	enlarged	 set	of	policy	options	 in	 an	 integrated	multiphase	model	
that	would	 extend	 the	partial	 “BAM+(applied)R&D+UCL”	 structure	 that	 has	been	analyzed	 (in	
section	4.4).66		But	that	task	will	be	rendered	more	feasible	by	tackling	it	within	the	simplifying	
framework	of	a	“social	planning	model,”	as	the	 latter	setting	dispenses	with	a	 large	number	of	
complicated	 assumptions	 ‐‐	 concerning	 the	market	behaviors	 of	 private	 economic	 agents,	 and	






65	 Although	 under	 the	 suppostions	 of	 our	 deterministic	 optimal	 control	models	 of	 the	 climate‐stablizing	 transition	
path	 those	 techniques	 never	would	 need	 to	 deployed	 in	 a	 “back‐stop”	 role,	 even	were	 to	 some	 among	 them	 to	 be	
economically	as	well	as	 technically	 feasible	and	environmentally	safe	 to	 implement.	But	 in	 the	 latter	circumstances	
the	 investment	 in	 finding	 those	 method	 could	 nevertheless	 have	 a	 substantial	 social	 pay‐off,	 especially	 when	 the	
transition	to	a	low	carbon	global	production	regime	had	to	be	completed	in	reasonably	short	order.	In	that	case	it	is	
most	 likely	 that	 a	 considerable	 stock	 of	 operational	 carbon‐based	 capital	 would	 have	 to	 de‐activated	 before	 the	
sustainable	economic	growth	phase	began.		But,	by	deploying	atmospheric	carbon	capture	(ACC)	techniques	that	were	
(ex	 hypothesis)	 technically	 effective	 and	 economically	 practical,	 the	 concentration	 level	 of	 CO2	 could	 be	 gradually	
lowered	 far	 enough	 to	 allowing	 the	 “moth‐balled”	 carbon‐based	 production	 facilities	 to	 be	 brought	 back	 into	
production,	 thereby	 yielding	 a	 finite	 flow	 of	 social	 quasi‐rents.	 A	 fast	 transition	 also	would	 imply	 that	 the	 latter’s	
present	 value	would	 not	 have	 been	 so	 severely	 reduced	 by	 discounting.	 	 Of	 course,	 in	 a	 stochastic	 control	 setting,	
“back‐stop”	geo‐engineering	investment	would	have	positive	insurance	value	even	were	the	research	results	to	turn	
out	 never	 to	 be	 needed,	 or	 deemed	 too	 risky	 in	 their	 potential	 environmental	 side‐effects	 to	 be	 deployed	 only	 to	
capture	the	private	quasi‐rents..			
66	 A	 start	 was	 made	 on	 this	 research	 agenda	 by	 David	 and	 van	 Zon	 (2012:section	 3),	 in	 working	 out	 the	 phase	
structures	of	the	transition	path(s)	for	a	model	that	integrated	“BAM	+	R&D”	with	a	“buy	time”	option	that	involved	
incremental	“retrofitting	investments”	(for	applied	engineering	and	capital	equipment)	to	upgrade	the	environmental	
performance	 of	 carbon‐using	 capital.	 The	 specific	 functional	 purpose	 of	 the	 latter	 class	 of	 options	 is	 to	 lower	 CO2	















and	 administrative	 processes,	 and,	 of	 course,	 still	 others	 that	 properly	 reflected	 observed		
behavioral	 patterns	 of	 private	 economic	 agents	 in	 response	 to	market	 signals	 and	 regulatory	
inducements	and	restraints.			
			Moreover,	 it	 is	 to	 be	 expected	 that	 the	 design	 of	 the	 optimal	 inter‐temporal	 policy	
implementation	program	–	were	one	to	emerge	from	the	analysis,	would	depart	substantially	in	
many	respects	from	the	requirements	 indicated	by	the	social	planning	optimum.	 	Because	it	 is	
dealing	with	a	process	to	be	played	out	in	major	part	within	a	decentralized	market	setting,	the	
implementation	program	would	involve	recourse	to	the	use	of	policy	instruments	in	addition	to	
(inevitably	 interactive	 with)	 public‐private	 joint	 ventures	 and	 government	 led	 “technology	
push”	 measures.	 The	 plural	 here	 is	 inescapable	 in	 the	 relevant	 practical	 context	 of	 a	 global	
system	 with	 multiple	 sovereign	 political	 authorities‐‐however	 far	 one	 can	 hope	 to	 go	 by	




“practical”	 means	 to	 implement	 the	 indicated	 allocation	 of	 resources	 (within	 each	 of	 the	
successive	phases	of	the	optimal	transition	path	found	by	the	DIRAM	planner)	would	distort	the	
allocation	 that	 materialized	 in	 the	 first	 phase,	 making	 it	 necessary	 to	 alter	 the	 indicated	
requirements	 for	 the	phase	 that	would	 follow,	 and	so	on.	 In	principle,	 at	 least,	 the	distortions	
and	 the	 welfare	 losses	 entailed	 by	 a	 well‐specified	 policy	 implementation	 program	 could	 be	
calculable.	 This	 step	 on	 the	 path	 toward	 stochastic	 control	 modeling	 that	 allows	 mid‐course	
corrections	 when	 expectations	 are	 not	 realized,	 however,	 generally	 would	 require	 taking	 an	
intervening	and	non‐trivial	task:	fully	specifying	a	model	of	the	behavior	of	private	sector	actors	
in	 response	 to	 the	array	of	 relative	price	and	 cost	 changes,	 and	 subsidies,	 taxes	and	penalties	
introduced	by	fiscal	and	regulatory	measures	designed	by	a	public	actor	in	order	to	implement	
the	 policy	 in	 question.	 Further	 allowance	 would	 need	 to	 be	 made	 for	 adjustment	 costs	 of	





presented	 in	 these	pages,	 the	policy	 relevance	 of	 showing	how	an	 enlightened	 social	welfare‐
optimizing	planner	might	run	a	“tech	fix”	program	to	stabilize	the	global	climate	system	under	
various	technological	and	climatic	system	constraints	remains		bounded	by	the	relevance	of	the	
circumstances	envisaged	by	 those	models.	The	extent	 to	which	 the	planner’s	optimal	program	
offers	 practical	 guidance	 for	 the	 design	 of	 climate	 policies	 that	 is	 of	 use	 to	 policy–making	 by	





allocation	 of	 resources;	 they	 will	 have	 to	 cope	 as	 best	 they	 can	 by	 applying	 indirect	 and	
comparatively	weak	and	uncertain	 instruments	 in	highly	decentralized	political	 and	economic	
settings.		
In	view	of	the	formidable	challenges	posed	by	such	a	program,		perhaps	the	most	useful	
immediately	 feasible	 exercises	 that	 can	 be	 conducted	 using	 the	 foundations	 provided	 by	 our	















on	19‐21	June.	 	 It	 is	an	extensive	revision	and	expansion	of	 the	authors’	contribution	to	program	of	 the	
2012	International	Energy	Workshop	Conference,	held	19‐21st	June	in	Cape	Town,	South	Africa.		We	take	
this	 occasion	 to	 gratefully	 acknowledge	 helpful	 and	 encouraging	 comments	 on	 previous	 drafts	 from	
Lawrence	 Goulder,	 Charles	 Kolstad,	 Thomas	 Rutherford,	 Warren	 Sanderson,	 and	 the	 members	 of	 the	














sub‐phases	 involves	 the	 existence	 in	 U1	 of	 an	 R&D	process	 that	 needs	 resourcing	 from	 some	














T CKACeH    .	 	 	 	 									(A.1)	
	
Since	 the	 first	 order	 condition	 for	 consumption	 can	 be	 solved	 for	 C,	 giving	 rise	 to
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